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THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATE AND LOCAL INVESTMENT
RESTRICTIONS IMPACTING FOREIGN
COUNTRIES
Abstract: State and local pension funds have billions of dollars invested
in global markets, and often use these assets to pressure foreign nations
to change their human rights policies. Social investing practices and
other non-social investment decisions impacting foreign nations may be
impermissible incursions into the federal government's exclusive power
over foreign policy under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, an
implied constitutional restriction on state activity. This Note argues that
in this era of global markets, a blanket prohibition against criticism of
foreign nations does not allow states to fulfill their investment
obligations. This Note calls for a flexible test to determine the
constitutionality of state action—a test that considers the federal
government's need for uniformity in foreign policy with the need of
state governments to be global economic actors.
INTRODUCTION
State and municipal governments have often used the economic
power of their pension funds to protest the conduct of foreign na-
tions that they have determined follow socially unacceptable human
rights policies.' These state and municipal actions have included di-
vesting from companies that do business in the offending nations,
requiring compliance with certain employment practices by compa-
nies that do business abroad and spearheading shareholder resolu-
tions, through their pension stock ownership, to encourage compa-
nies to alter their corporate practices when they operate overseas. 2
These initiatives mirror state and municipal participation in the eco-
nomic boycott of apartheid South Africa beginning in the 1970s. 3
I See, e.g., Camille Q. Bradford, Coals of Public Institutional Investors, in 1NsTrrt1TIoNAL
INVESTORS, SOCIAL INVESTING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 37-45 (Roger Clegg ed..
1996) (describing the history of social investing),
2 See id. at 41-42.
3 See James F. Hogg, issues Raised by Institutional Investing, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
SOCIAL INVESTING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (Roger Clegg ed., 1996).
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Subsequent state and municipal action has focused on Northern Ire-
land, and more recently, countries such as Burma, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Tibet, Cuba and China. 4 In addition to proposals relating to the in-
vestment of pension funds, state and municipal expressions of con-
cern over human rights conditions abroad have included limitations
on state and municipal governments' ability to engage in contracts
with companies that do business in a suspect country. 5
Both pension investment proposals and purchasing rules, driven
by social policy goals, raise constitutional issues relating to state and
local governments' ability to effectuate foreign policy. 6 Because the
Constitution created a federal system of government, the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power reserves power over foreign affairs exclusively
to the federal government and precludes states and municipalities
from interfering with the foreign affairs power of the federal govern-
ment.7 Although not a power expressly enumerated in the Constitu-
tion, the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is generally considered to
derive from the structure of the Constitution. 8 Because power to con-
duct foreign affairs falls within, the bailiwick of the federal govern-
ment, state and local authorities may be encroaching into an area oc-
cupied exclusively by Congress and the Executive Branch.° In short,
4 See, e.g., Paul Bluestein, Thinking Globally, Punishing Locally: States, Cities Rash In Impose
Their Own Sanctions, Angering Companies and Foreign Affairs Experts, WASH. POST, May 16,
1997, at 01 (describing current social investing initiatives).
65ee, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 7, § 226-M (1998) ("Massachusetts Burma Law"). The
Investor Responsibility Research Center reports that nineteen municipal governments in
addition to Massachusetts have adopted purchasing restrictions on companies that do
business in.Burma. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
STATE AND LOCAL SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAWS AS OF JIM' 1998 15-82, 159 (1998).
6 See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999), affil sub
now. Crosby V. Nat'l Foreign Thule Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2290-291 (2000); Board of
'Frs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 748-49 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990). Commentators have debated whether the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power pre-
cludes state action in both purchasing and investment decisions. Compare Kevin P. Lewis,
Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 Tut..
L. REv. 469, 470-71 (1987) (arguing that state investment restrictions are constitutional),
with Daniel Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States Stale and Local Sanc-
tions, 39 HARv. INT'L U. 443, 447-48 (1998) (arguing that state purchasing laws are un-
constitutional).
7 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 162
(1996).
8 SeePerez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
9SeerIENKm. supra note 7, at 162-4i5; Lewis, supra note 6, at 470-71; Price & Hannah,
supra note 6, at 447-48.
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state and local efforts to protest the acts of foreign entities may violate
basic principles of federalism embedded in the Constitution. 1 °
In the 2000 term, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, held that a Massachusetts selec-
tive purchasing statute that prohibited the state from hiring contrac-
tors that conducted business in Myanmar (formerly Burma) was pre-
empted by federal sanctions against Burma. 11
 A trade association
argued that the Massachusetts law violated the Dormant Foreign Af-
fairs Power and the Foreign Commerce Clause, and also was pre-
empted by federal sanctions. 12
 Although the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held the law unconstitutional on all three
grounds, the Supreme Court affirMed only on the preemption issue. 13
The Court declined to discuss either the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power or the Foreign Commerce Clause arguments, thus leaving open
the question of whether a state or local action impermissibly inter-
feres with the federal government's power over foreign affairs."
The Crosby decision indicates that the Court is hesitant to invoke
a broad prohibition on state action that impacts foreign affairs, but
instead would prefer to decide these issues on the narrower ground of
preemption. 15
 One can imagine situations arising, however, where
states will protest foreign nations' policies, but Congress does not act
at al1. 16
 In these situations, the Court will be unable to base its deci-
sion on preemption and will be required to explore the boundaries of
the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.' 7
The First Circuit's discussion of the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power describes a doctrine that would severely curtail state and mu-
nicipal governments' ability to use their investment power to protest
human rights violations abroad. 18
 The decision's reasoning further
1 °See Natsios, 181 F.3d al 45; Price & Ilannall, 5,4P/W note 6, at 455-71.
11 See 120 S. Ct. 2288,2302 (2000).
12 See id. at 2293.
12 See id. at 2302, aff'g sub non?. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38
(1st Cir. 1999).
14 See id, al 2294 11.8 ("Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with federal
law is sufficient to affirm the judgement below, we decline 10 pass on the First Circuit's
rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.").
15 see id,
16
 For example, the Massachusetts Burma Law was actually passed three months prior
to the enactment of Congressional sanctions against Burma. See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2291,
17 See id. at 2294 11.8.
18 See. Natsios, 181 E3d at 45,55-56 (declining, however, to rule on the constitutionality
of similar restrictions on pensim I investments).
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implicates any area of state action that touches upon foreign affairs. 19
Because state and local governments have emerged as global eco-
nomic actors, with over a trillion dollars invested in financial markets,
courts must articulate boundaries between acceptable, incidental in-
trusions into foreign affairs and unacceptable expressions of foreign
policy.20 Without a clear constitutional rule, many state and local deci-
sions might be construed as violations of the federal government's
foreign affairs power. 21.
This Note examines the scope of the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power as a constitutional limitation on state and local governments'
pension fund investment proposals and argues that, in its current
formulation, the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power would preclude any
state and local investment action deemed critical of a foreign nation.
Part I summarizes past and current social investment activity. 22 Part II
examines Supreme Court and lower court decisions based on the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power. 23 Part III presents majority and mi-
nority formulations of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, and sug-
gests the outcome to constitutional challenges to state and local gov-
ernments' investment decisions under those interpretations. 24 Part IV
presents policy considerations that the current formulations fail to
address and suggests that the Court adopt a functional approach to
future cases. 25 This Note advocates a less restrictive approach to the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power that accounts for both the need for
uniformity in United States foreign policy and the need for states and
municipalities, as global investors, to have flexibility in their invest-
ment decisions.
19 See id. at 45. Naisios would certainly buttress the position that these acts are unconsti-
tutional. Compare Lewis, supra note 6, at 470-71 (concluding state divestment laws targeting
single nations are constitutional); with Price & Hannah, supra note 6, at 447-48 (conclud-
ing state purchasing laws targeting single nations are unconstitutional).
2') Compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,441 (1968) (invalidating a state law that
may disturb foreign relations), with Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,517-18 (1947) (upholding
a state law as not infringing on the federal government's constitutionally enumerated for-
eign affairs powers because it had an incidental effect on foreign countries).
21 see, e.g., Naisios, 181 F.3d at 61 11.18 (declining to consider if a state could pass a
resolution condemning a foreign nation for human rights violations under the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power).
See infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 71-201 and accompanying text.
2-i See infra notes 202-341 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 342-394 and accompanying text.
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I. STATE AND MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
State and municipal govermnents, through their pension invest-
ment portfolios, represent a powerful force in the financial markets,
and, therefore, constituents and social activists often call upon them
to effectuate social policy goals through their economic power. 26 Di-
rect initiatives for pension funds to alter their investments to advance
social causes, as well as investment decisions regarding the manage-
ment of international portfolios, may implicate the federal govern-
ment's power over foreign affairs. 27 Although state and municipal
governments manage public pension funds, pension funds are not
government assets. 28 Instead, the state or municipality must hold as-
sets in trust for the benefit of the plan participants. 2° As such, public
pension plans, when making investment decisions, have a fiduciary
duty to pension plan participants to manage assets for the exclusive
benefit of participants. 88
No longer confined to investment in government securities, pub-
lic pension funds are major economic players in financial markets. 31
In 1998, state and municipal pension funds held over $1.7 trillion in
26 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 37: Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993). Public pension funds are
considered to be more active than other investors in social investing issues. See Hogg, supra
note 3, at 12.
27 See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999), afftl
sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2290-291 (2000); Board of
Trs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 748-49 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990).
28 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-15: §35-10-6(b) (1997) (establishing a trust for
pension fluids).
" See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LANS'S § 35—I0-6(b) (establishing that pension fends must be in-
vested for the exclusive benefit of plan participants); see also '16 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994). To
maintain federal preferential tax treatment that allows eniployee pension contributions to
be made on a pre-tax basis and earnings to accrue on a tax-exempt basis, a public pension
plan must comply %yid' Internal Revenue Code provisions. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 401
(establishing requirements for pre@ential tax trean nen ).
50 See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2). To' be a qualified trust under the Internal Revenue Code,
it must be itnpossible, prior to tire satisfaction of all liabilities to participants and their
beneficiaries, to divert any part of the corpus or income from the trust to purposes other
than the exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries. See id.
51 See David M. Walker, 7'he Increasing Role of Pension Funds in the Capital Mathets and in
Ccoporate Governance Matters, in INsTrrirrloNAL INVESTING: THE CHALLENGES AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF TILE 21ST CENTURY 34-37 (Arnold W. Swum ed., 1991); Romano, supra note
26, at 799-800.
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financial assets.32 Of this amount, approximately $1.2 trillion was in-
vested in non-governmental securities, with $639 billion in corporate
stocks, $258 billion in corporate bonds and $195 billion in interna-
tional investments." Because public pension funds invest so much in
the private sector, they may become subject to social investment re-
strictions. 34
 Furthermore, as public pension funds are increasing their
investment allocation to international markets in an effort to modern-
ize portfolio management and gain higher returns, any direct invest-
ment by the pension fund abroad may be subject to social investment
restrictions."
Nearly one quarter of public pension funds must invest their as-
sets in accordance with .some type of social investment restriction."
First, some proposals have called for an outright divestment from sus-
pect countries and companies that do business in suspect countries. 57
Second, state and municipal governments have sought to encourage
companies operating abroad to adhere to particular business prac-
tices that promote social goals advanced by local governments."
32
 See Census Bureau Data Shows Rise in Public Retirement Plan Holdings, BNA PENSION &
BENEFITS REPORTER, Feb. 22, 2099, at 568. Stale and municipal pension fund assets are
glowing at substantial rates, In I095, they were estimated to.have assets of over $1.3 tril-
lion. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 150 (4th ed. 1997).
33
 See Census Bureau Data Shows Rise in Public Retirement Plan Holdings, supra note 32, at
568,
54 See Hogg, SUpro note 3, at 12; Romano, supra note 26, at 797. A study by the Social
Investment Forum found that $2 lrilli011 Or approximately 13% of funds are invested in
socially screened portfolibs-43% of this social investment was based 011 human rights
concerns. See Barry B. Burr, Sin Screens: Socially Investing Tops $2 Trillion in U.S., PENSIONS
AND INVESTMENTS, Nov. 15, 1999, at 8.
35
 See U.S. Pension Plans Investing More Assets in International Equities, RNA PENSION &
BENEFITS REPORTER, May 11, 1998, at 1121; Susan Barreto, Police, Fire Funds to Go Abroad,
PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS,illne 1, 1998, at see also EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE
OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 30-31 (1998) (describing
the growth in international direct investments); 1NsT1'rtmoNAL INVESTOR, Public Funds:
Plans Break Free From Investment Restrictions, MONEY MGMT. LETTER, Dec. 28, 1998, at 8 (de-
scribing the increased discretion given to fund boards to select equity investments, includ-
ing international investments).
34 See INsTrrtmoNAL INVESTOR, Think Tank Views Public Funds as Too Political, MONEY
MGMT. LEITER, May 17, 1999, at 10.
37 See, e.g., PETER DESIMONE & WILLIAM F. MOSES, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RE-
SEARCH CENTER, A GUIDE TO AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL LAWS ON SOUTH AFRICA 2
(1095) (describing divestment policies).
55 See, e.g., FRY, supra note 35, at 95 (describing types of state actions against Northern
Ireland).
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Third, state and municipal governments have increasingly become
participants in shareholder resolution activity designed to facilitate
the withdrawal of companies from suspect countries or to change
overseas business practices." Finally, state and municipal pension
funds, through their day-to-day investment decisions, may impact in-
ternational markets."
Divestment has been the most visible form of social investing ac-
tivity by state and local governments. 41
 As part of a comprehensive
boycott against South Africa in the 1980s, a total of thirty-two states
and the United States Virgin Islands enacted some type of sanction
against South Africa. 42 These sanctions were not limited to partial or'
total divestment from companies doing business in South Africa and
bans on new investment, but also included restrictions against using
banks that do business in South Africa and selective contracting and
purchasing rules.° Additionally, 113 cities adopted some type of sanc-
tion against South Africa, and another forty local governmental units
(such as county governments or transit authorities) adopted sanc-
tions.44 In the wake of the success of the South Africa campaign, many
states and municipalities have considered or have enacted laws and
policies regarding their investment in companies that do business in
suspect countries, including° Burma, Indonesia, Nigeria, Switzerland
39 See, e.g., Kurt N. Schacht, Institutional Investors and Shawladder Activism: Ca/3C or Cure?,
in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, SOCIAL. INVESTING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 26 (pre-
senting a history of public pension activity in shareholder resolutions).
40 See Walker, ,supm note 31, at 43-44 (outlining the growing role of pension plans in
the financial markets).
41 Srr, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall Jr., The Constitutionality of State and
Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of Slate, States' Affairs, or A Sorry Slate of
Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 307-08 (1999) (describing proliferation of divest-
ment proposals targeting South Africa).
42 See DEStmoNE & MOSES, s/Ipia note 37, at 2. The Ibllowing states adopted some form
of South Africa sanctions: Arkansas; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Hawaii;
Illinois; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; I ∎ laryltuid; Massachusetts; Michigaii;
Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; New Jersey; New YOrk; North Carolina; North Dakota;
Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Vermont; Virginia;
West Virginia; and Wisconsin. See id. at 17-18.
45 See DESimoNE & MOSES, 511Pla note 37, at 2, 17-22.
44 See id. at 18-22.
45 Sre, e.g., USA ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List at littp://www. usaen-
gage.org/news/status.html (last updated Mar. 2000) (listing state and local purchasing
and investment restrictions targeting specific countries). California, Connecticut, Colo-
ntdo, Texas, Vermont, and Maine have considered investment or purchasing bills relating
to Burma. See A.B. 888. 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (purchasing); S.R. 5, 61st Gen. Ass.
(Colo. 1997) (non-binding resolution against purchasing); H.B. 6354, 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 1997) (purchasing); S.P. 783, 119th Leg. (Me. 1999) (purchasing and investment);
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and China. Some initiatives contain detailed legislative findings about
these countries' perceived negative policies. 46
In addition to partial or total divestment from companies that do
business in a suspect country, several state and municipal pension
funds have sought to encourage certain employment practices when
companies operate abroad. 47 For example, Rhode Island, Massachu-
FEB. 3369, 181st Leg. (Mass. 1999) (investment); H.B. 1090, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999) (pur-
chasing and investment); FEB. 34 65th Leg. (Vt. 1999) (shareholder resolutions regarding
Burma). New York City and Los Angeles have adopted anti-Burma ordinances. See USA
ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Il'atch List.
In 1999, both Massachusetts and Rhode Island considered, but did not adopt, laws
banning investments in companies doing business in Indonesia. See H.B. 3165 181st Leg.
(Mass. 1999); H.B. 6424 1999-2000 Leg. (R.I. 1999). In 1998, a bill restricting purchasing
and investment in Nigeria failed to pass the Maryland Assembly. See S.B. '354, 1998 Reg.
Sess. (Md. 1998); FEB. 1273, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998). Municipalities that have passed
ordinances targeting Nigeria include Alameda County, Cal. (purchasing, investments and
bank deposits); Amherst, Mass. (purchasing, investments and bank deposits); Berkeley,
Cal. (purchasing); Oakland, Cal. (purchasing, investments, and bank deposits). See USA
ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List. In 1098, New York City, New York State, Cali-
fornia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey considered sanctions against Switzerland, including
limiting investment in Swiss companies and/or restricting use of Swiss banks and Swiss-
owned investment money managers to encourage Swiss banks to make restitution to Holo-
caust victims and their families. See Susan Barrett) & Tamela Odom, Public Funds Enter Holo-
caust Fray, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, July 13, 1098, at I. The State of New Jersey Division
of Investment was ordered by the Governor of New jersey to cease investing in Swiss-owned
companies. See id. It 1998, Virginia considered a bill that would prohibit state procure-
ment of foreign-made goods produced with indentured labor in China. See H.B. 1324,
1998 Sess. (Va. 1998).
4° See, e.g., 1NvEsTon RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, pipra note 5, at 8:3108 (re-
producing full text of city ordinances concerning Nigeria). These ordinances contain leg-
islative findings that express a moral responsibility "to take positive steps to end human
rights abuses and support legitimately elected governments." See id. at 91. The findings
fitrtlier detail the invalidation of a democratic election in Nigeria by a military dictatorship
and the imprisonment for treason of the candidate who is believed to have won the elec-
tion, the documentation of human rights abuses by international groups, and specific
arrests and executions of dissidents in Nigeria. See id. at 91-92, 96.
17 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7513.5 (West 2000) (requiring reports on investments in
Northern Ireland detailing compliance with the MacBride Principles); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 3-131t(b) (West 1999) (requiring divestment of coaporations doing business in
Northern Ireland and not in compliance with the MacBride Principles); 1087 Mass. Acts
ch. 697 § 133 (requiring a report of invested companies compliance with the MacBride
Principles); Micit. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.1133a (West 1999) (requiring investment
fiduciary to support shareholder resolutions to adopt the MacBride Principles); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 11A.241 (1997) (requiring an annual report about investments in Northern
Ireland. requesting board support or sponsor shareholder resolutions, but specifically
stating that divestment is not required); NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1246.06 (1995) (requiring
the state investment officer to report on compliance of investments with the MacBride
Principles); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6:32, § 6:34 (1999) (requiring treasurer to report on
invested corporations' compliance with the MacBride Principles and limit future invest-
ments to corporations adhering to the principles); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-89.4; § 52:34—
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setts and New York have adopted investment policies requesting that
companies doing business in Northern Ireland comply with the
MacBride Principles which are designed to protect the minority
Catholic population in Northern Ireland from employment discrimi-
nation." Some state laws relating to Northern Ireland are precatory,
only requiring a report about corporations' compliance with the
MacBride Principles." Other state laws mandate divestment from
companies failing to comply with the MacBride Principles." As eco-
nomic boycotts against South Africa were lifted, some states adopted
socially responsible investment guidelines similar to the MacBride
Principles to govern reinvestment in South Africa. 51 For example,
Massachusetts requires that South Africa investments be made in ac-
cordance to the African National Congress's guiding principles that
ask companies to use fair employment practices and environmental
protection policies. 52
Some social investing proponents have advocated abandoning
the divestment strategy and instead using stock ownership to encour-
age changes in company behavior through shareholder resolutions—
a movement that mirrors the growing use of shareholder resolutions
by public pension funds to reform corporate governance generally. 53
12.2 (1999) (authorizing-
 director to report on invested corporations compliance with the
MacBride Principles and restricting stale pin -chasing to bidders that comply with the prin-
ciples); N.Y. RETIREMENT AND Soc. SEC. LAW § 423-a (McKinney 1999) (restricting stale
investments to companies complying with the MacBride Principles); R.I. GEN. LAWS e 35-
10-14 (1997) (requiring monitoring and reporting of pension fund investments in North-
ern Ireland for compliance with the MacBride Principles). In 1999, California enacted a
similar measure that targets Switzerland. See 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 216 (West) (requiring
the state pension fonds to ITI011hor and report on companies and their affiliates that owe
compensation to victims of World War II slave labor).
49 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-1 31i (b) (restating the MacBride Principles).
49 See CAL. GOVT CODE § 7513.5; 1987 Mass. Acts ch. 697 § 133: MINN. STAT. ANN.
§11A.241; NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1246.06; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:32; NJ. STAT, ANN,
§ 52:18A-89.4; R.I. GEN, LAWS § 35-10-14.
5° See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-13110* N.1-1. REV'. STAT. ANN. § 6:34; N.V. RETIRE-
MENT AND Soc. SEC. LAW § 423-a.
51
 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 32 § 23 (2A) (Ii), (5); R.I. GEN. Laws § 35-10-12
(1997).
52 Sre MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32 § 23 (2A) (It), (5).
63 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 41-42 (noting that advocates have argued that divest-
ment is not the only means to effectuate a change in corporate policy on social issues);
Ricki Fulman, Investors Push lo Cu! Myanmar . Ties, PENSIONS AND 1NVESTNIENTS, Nov. 10,
1997, at 38; Romano, SUPM note 26, at 797; see also Schacht, supra note 39, at 27-28 (noting
a 400% increase. in shareholder resolutions on corporate governance matters front 1986 to
1990); Walker, supra note 31, at 43-45 (discussing corporate governance issues raised by
the growth of private and public pension plan assets in equities).
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Social investing resolutions encourage a company to adopt certain
business practices or withdraw its operations from certain countries. 54
A number of state laws mandate how pension fund directors or state
treasurers must vote in shareholder resolutions relating to social is-
sues. 55 For example, on repeal of its South Africa divestment law, the
Rhode Island General Assembly directed the State Investment Com-
mission to encourage, through shareholder proxy voting, corpora-
tions doing business in South Africa to comply with socially responsi-
ble standards established by the South African Council of Churches. 56
Although some states specify shareholder voting as a matter of
law, pension investment boards also can set their own policy with re-
gard to shareholder resolutions. 57 For example, the New York City
Employees Retirement System ("NYCERS") sponsored several share-
holder resolutions to implement the MacBride Principles. 58 In 1994,
shareholders of Unocal Corporation, including the NYCERS and the
State of Connecticut Trust Funds, supported a shareholder proxy
resolution before Unocal to disclose information about its business in
Burma. 59 Furthermore, activists have pursued shareholder resolutions
that would require companies to adopt general corporate codes of
5-F
	
INVESTOR RESPONSIISILITY RESEARCH CENTER, HOW INSTITUTIONS VOTED ON SO-
CIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN THE 1992 PROXY SEASON 64-101 (1992) (list-
ing shareholder resolutions related to South Africa and Northern Ireland); Ftdman, strpm
note 53, at 38.
55 See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE §7513.5(c) (West 2000) (requiring reports on investments
in Northern Ireland detailing compliance with the MacHride Principles); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 3-1311(a) (authorizing the Slate Treasurer to initiate or support shareholder
resolutions relating to Northern Ireland); 1987 Mass. Acts ch. 697 § 133 (requiring that
state pension boards initiate and vote shareholder resolutions consistent with non-
discrimination provisions as applied to Northern Ireland); MIcti. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 38.1I33a, sec. 13a (2) (requiring investment fiduciary to support shareholder resolutions
to adopt the MacBride Principles); Nil. REV. S -rxr. ANN. § 6:33 (1999) (authorizing state
treasurer to sponsor or support shareholder resolutions to adopt the MacBride Principles);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52;18A-89.4 (authorizing director to support shareholder resolutions
regarding equal opportunity in Northern Ireland); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-10-12 (requiring
State Investment Commission through shareholder resolutions to encourage corporations
doing business in South Africa to adopt certain employment practices); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 35-10-14(c) (requiring treasurer to support shareholder resolutions for compliance with
the MacBride Principles).
56 See R.I. GEN. LAW'S § 35-10-12.
57 See Romano, supra note 26, at 831-32. Romano notes that, unlike private plans, pub-
lic plans do not usually defer to the judgement of their external investment managers ill
proxy votes. See id.
58 See Partial Checklist of Shareholder Resolutions, CORP. Soc. ISSUES REP., AUg.-Sept. 1999,
at 23-24; Partial Checklist of Shareholder Resolutions, CORP. SOC. ISSUES REP., Oct. 1999, at 15.
59 See Marlene Givant Star, fluorin is Investors' Issue; Social Coalition May Sue to Get Resolu-
tions on Proxies, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, May 29, 1995, at 37.
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conduct regarding human rights, without identifying a specific target
country.60
 As fiduciaries of a public pension fund, the investment
board or treasurer may have an obligation to vote in shareholder reso-
lutions.61
State and municipal legislative bodies, ultimately responsible for
the pension fund, generally delegate the clay to clay investment
authority to a board or commission.62
 Because these boards have
authority to make investment decisions not explicitly mandated by a
legislative act, their actions might also implicate foreign affairs. 63 As
global investors, pension fund boards make decisions about investing
in foreign countries based on •investment risk. 64 These decisions,
whether to reject, divest or reduce investment in a given country,
could be viewed as commenting on a foreign nation's policies. 65 An
investment decision may be based on a foreign country's internal
management of its affairs—i.e., its political stability, its regulation of
6° See Marlene Givant Star, PepsiCo Plans to Divest Stake in Burrnew Operation, PENSIONS
AND INVESTMENTS, May 13, 1996. at 8. The code would require a company to consider
investment or withdrawal from countries 'with a pattern of ongoing, systematic violation of
human rights where a government is illegitimate or where there is a call by human rights
advocates, pro-democracy organizations or legitimately elected representatives for eco-
nomic sanctions against their country." See id.
61 See generally Mark E. Brossman & Joint F. Cinque, Proxy IlUing and Shairholder Activ-
ism: The Emerging issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., June 1996, at 5. Brossman and Cinque out-
line the Department of Labor's position that it is a fiduciary duty under ERISA of em-
ployee benefit plan trustees to vote shareholder proxies, unless that ditty has been
explicitly or implicitly delegated to investment managers. See id. at 5—(i. Although public
pension funds are not subject to ERISA, the trustees of public plans are required to act as
fiduciaries. See id. at 6.
62
 See, e.g., R. I. GEN, LAWS § 35-10-6 (1997) (delegating investment authority to the
state investinent commission).
0 See, e.g.. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, CALPERS PUshes Shareholder ; .'alues in Asia, EM E RG-
I NG MARKETS WEEK, May 10, 1999, at 1 (outlining recent efforts of the California Public.
Employees Retirement System to promote stronger corporate governance policies in Asian
companies).
134 See. e.g.. Steve Hemmerick, Expecting Comeback: Plans Bet on Recovery; CALPERS, Wis-
consin Among Funds Banking on Quick Resurgence in Asian Economies, PENSIONS AND INVEST-
MENTS, Mar. 22, 1999, at 1 (noting that one investment manager indicated that countries
such as Indonesia, South Vietnam, China and Malaysia were bad investment risks); Funds
Trim Allocation to Russia, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Aug. 24, 1998, at 10 (noting general
market reduction in Russian holdings).
0 See, e.g., Joel Cherimff, Many Questions: CalPERS Looks at Social Issues in Emerging Mae.
her's, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, jail, 10, 2000, at 25. The California Public Employees
Retirement System ("CalPERS"), the largest U.S. public pension fund, creates an invest-
ment list of acceptable cmint•ies based in part on a "civil society criteria" that includes
democratization and human rights factors. See id. CalPERS has considered hidng a politi-
cal risk consultant to examine the countries in which they invest. See id.
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its own markets, or its debt practices. 66 In addition, public pension
funds can use their economic power to effectuate policy changes re-
garding financial practices in foreign countries.°
For nearly two decades states and municipalities have used their
economic power to express their citizens' concerns about the conduct
of foreign nations. 68 At the same time, state and municipal pension
funds have become more diversified investors, increasing both in-
vestments in corporations operating internationally and direct in-
vestment abroad.69 The growing role of states and municipalities as
global investors makes them more desirable targets to advance social
investing goals and makes it more likely that even non-socially moti-
vated investment decisions could be viewed as impacting on foreign
affairs."
IL THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER: SUPREME COURT AND
LOWER COURT DECISIONS
State and municipal social investment restrictions targeting for-
eign countries pose several constitutional questions.'" First, these re-
strictions could be considered an infringement upon the federal gov-
ernment's exclusive power over foreign affairs—the Dormant Foreign
66 See Chernoff, supra note 65, at 25; flemmerick, supra note 64, at 1.
67 See, e.g., Laura Mahoney, cALPERS, United Kingdom Firm Form International Corporate
Governance Alliance, DNA PENSION & BENEFITS REPORTER, Nov. 30, 1998, at 2738 (reporting
that Call'ERS has been actively seeking better corporate governance structure in foreign
countries); Laura Mahoney, CaLPERS Predicts Major Disruptions in International Investment
Markets, DNA PENSION & BENEFITS REPORTER, June 21, 1999, at 1658 (reporting that GA-
PERS also sought to pressure foreign companies into Y2K compliance measures).
69 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 26, at 795, 806-07 (noting that political pressure on
public pension funds. particularly from unions, affects investment decisions).
69 See Walker, SlIpro note 31, at 37 (citing an estimate that the international investment
by public pension funds would grow from 2.6 percent to five percent of assets front 1991 to
1994).
70 See Romano, supra note 26, at 806-07.
71 See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55-56, aff'd sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2290-91 (2000) (declining to
comment on pension fund investment restrictions); Board of -Frs. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
562 A.2d at 757 (upholding the constitutionality of pension hind restrictions on South
Africa investments); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-24 at
1153-54 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing state investment restrictions and the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, Massachusetts Challenges the Burmese
Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 373, 400-
05 (1999) (same); Andrea McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid
Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 813, 817-47
(1989) (same).
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Affairs Power—an implied constitutional power. 72
 Second, social in-
vestment restrictions that impact foreign affairs may encroach upon
Congress's exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce, an enu-
merated power in the United States Constitution." Finally, sanctions
enacted by Congress, as in the case of South Africa and Burma, could
preempt state and local actions. 74
A. Supreme Court Decisions Establishing the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
The Supreme Court has inferred the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Doctrine from the structure of the Constitution, the federal govern-
ment's enumerated powers over foreign affairs and past Court state-
ments about the exclusive role of the federal government in conduct-
ing United States foreign policy." A state or municipality is precluded
72 See Price & Hannah, supra note 6, at 490-94 (arguing dial purchasing and divest-
ment taws should built be invalid under the Dorman) Foreign Affairs Power). But see Board
of • ., 562 A.2d at 749 (holding city divestinent ordinance constitutional under the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power).
73 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress Inay "regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations"). As an enumerated power, the regulation of foreign exclusive
to the federal government, and, even in the absence of direct congressional action, slates
are not allowed to regulate foreigit commerce. SeeTtunE, snjwa note 71, § 6-24, at 1150-51.
The Foreign Commerce Clause would be violated if social investment restrictions on com-
panies doing business abroad are deemed regulation of foreign commerce and not a pro-
prietary ordering of state affairs with no significant effect on fOreign affairs. See, e.g., Bar-
clays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (explaining that that
Foreign Commerce Clause does not preclude a non-discriminatory stale tax formula that
included income earned overseas); TRIBE, topic note 71, § 6-24 at 1150-52 (explaining
that states are allowed to regulate foreign commerce, such as foreign ships in their ports,
so long as there is no significant affect on foreign commerce).
74 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ci. 2288,2302 (2000); Natsios, 181
F.3d at 74-75; Board of Tis., 562 A.2d at 740-41; Thum MIMI note 71, § 6-28, at 1172-73.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, if the federal government
has spoken or has the power to speak on the issue, then federal action may preempt any
state action relating to the issue. See U.S. CONS•. art. VI, cl. 2; we also TRIBE, supra note 71,
§ 6-28, at 1 172-73 (explaining preemption analysis).
75 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 929,440-41 (1968); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,
516-17 (1947); Nines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1941). Although the Court has
not explicitly delineated (11c roots of the Dormant Foreign AlThirs Power, most commenta-
tors argue Mat this power is implicitly reserved to the federal government from the struc-
tnre, text and history of the Constitution. See, e.g., Denning & McCall, supra note 4, at 317-
24 (describing origins of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power); Lewis, SUPra note 6, al 508-
09 (arguing that the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power predates the Constitution as a chantc-
teristic of sovereignty); Price & Hannah, SUP• note 6, at 955 (acknowledging. however,
that the "constitutional so urce of [the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power] is uncertain"). But
see LIENKIN, supra note 7, at 162 ("Until 1968 there was no 11tH or such a principle [as the
Dormant Foreign Affairs•Powed."); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Colitis, Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,1641-42 (1997) (arguing that the Dormant Foreign Affairs
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from acting, not because the federal government has acted, but be-
cause the state or local government is encroaching on a power exclu-
sively held by the federal government. 76
Although the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is an implied re-
striction on state action, the Constitution does restrict explicitly some
state activity in the foreign relations area." Article I of the Constitu-
tion forbids a state front entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation" or to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." 78 States may
not "without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws." 79 States are also forbidden, without
congressional consent, from entering "into any Agreement or Com-
pact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay."8° States must also respect treaties of the United States as the
supreme law of the land. 81
The ConstitutiOn does not expressly grant power over foreign
affairs to the federal government, yet the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the federal -government has an exclusive power over for-
eign affairs. 82 For example, in 1937, in United States v. Belmont, the Su-
Power is a federal common law doctrine and not supported by the text of the Constitu-
tion); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the Stales in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding
of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 IsloTRE DAME L. REv. 341,346 (1999) (arguing that the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power has little textual basis in the Constitution, except perhaps in
the Constitution's presidential powers).
711 See liENKIN, supra note 7, at 163-64.
77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1,2,3, art. VI cl. 2.
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
79 Id. at cl. 2.
88 Id. at cl. 3.
81 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.	 •
82 See Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44,57 (1958). In Perez, the Supreme Court held that
despite the lack of specific enumeration in the Constitution, there is no doubt as to Con-
gress's power over foreign affairs. See id. at 57. The power is "indispensable' to a sovereign
nation and its ability to interact with other nations. See id.; see also Ramsey, supra note 75, at
351-56 (describing history of Supreme Court decisions on the federal government's ex-
clusive power over foreign affairs).
In some cases, however, states may make agreements with foreign governments with-
out the consent of Congress "so long as they do not impinge upon the authority or the
foreign relations of the United States." RESTATEMENT (TIIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 reporter's note 0. As the Natsios Court acknowledged, Massa-
chusetts alone tnaintains twenty-di•ce bilateral trade agreements with sub-national foreign
governments and trade organizations. See 181 F.3(1 at 50. Many states have sister state
agreements with foreign sub-national governments, have trade offices in other countries
and conduct trade missions overseas. See FRY, supra note 35, at 68-70,73.
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preme Court stated that power over foreign affairs is vested exclu-
sively in the federal government, and ruled that a decision by the New
York Court of Appeals was preempted by federal action—a diplomatic
agreement between the executive branch and the Soviet Union. 83 Al-
though the Belmont Court recognized an exclusive federal power over
foreign affairs, the Court decided that case, and most subsequent
cases, on preemption grounds, 84
Ten years later, the Supreme Court revisited the Dormant For-
eign Affairs Power in Clark v. Allen, 85
 In that case, the Court ruled that
a California statute governing the probate disposition of assets did not
interfere with the federal government's exclusive power to conduct
foreign affairs. 86 In Clark, six California residents, intestate heirs,
claimed that German nationals bequeathed property from a decedent
were ineligible heirs under California law.87
 The statute dictated that
the rights of non-resident aliens to take property depended on the
existence of reciprocal rights of citizens of the United States to take
property of persons dying in foreign countries. 88
 The California resi-
dents argued that the will should be voided because the German na-
tionals were ineligible heirs under California law since Germany did
not grant reciprocal rights to take property to United States resi-
dents.89
The Clark Court held that a 1923 treaty between the United
States and Germany did not preempt state law with regard to personal
83 See 301 U.S. 324, 330, 351-32 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs is
not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government."); see also United
States V. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (In our dealings with the outside world, the
United States speaks with one voice.") (Frankfurter,,., concurring); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, (105 (1889) ("The United States is not only a government, but
it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the charac-
ter of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war,
peace, negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to state
governments.").
See 301 U.S. al 330-32; see also Crosby v Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288.
2294 n.8, 2302 (2000) (ruling only on preemption issue and declining to pass on the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power). The Supreme Court's decision in Crosby is in keeping
with past Court decisions that couple narrow holdings with broad dicta about state and
federal relations in foreign affairs. See generally' Pink, 315 U.S. at 234 (holding diplomatic
agreement preempts state law); Hines, 312 U.S. at 62 (deciding case on preemption
grounds, not an exclusive federal power over foreign affairs).
85 See331 U.S. at 517-18.
86 See id. at 517-18.
87 See id. at 505-06.
88 See id. at 505
89 See id. at 505-06. The California residents sought to take the property as intestate
heirs. See id.
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property." The Court also held that the California statute, as applied
to personal property, was not an encroachment by the state into an
exclusive federal power over foreign affairs because inheritance is an
area of traditional local concern.91 Although the COurt acknowledged
that many state actions could have an effect on foreign countries and
that California's actions "will have some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries," the Court found that the state had not negoti-
ated with foreign nations or entered into compacts with foreign na-
tions in violation of the Constitution." The Clark Court did not ex-
plain what state action, except those actions explicitly forbidden by
the Constitution or preempted by federal law, would be unconstitu-
tional."
The Supreme Court has only once struck down a state law for
impermissibly interfering with the federal government's dormant
power over foreign affairs. 94 In 1968, in Zschernig v. Millet; the Su-
preme Court overruled.a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court re-
lating to the treatment of non-resident aliens in probate as a violation
of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power." In Zschernig, the decedent, a
resident of Oregon, died intestate. 96 The decedent's only potential
heirs lived in East Germany 97 At the time of the decedent's death,
Oregon law required that the non-resident alien's country confer the
same rights to United States citizens inheriting property as the United
States confers to the alien citizens of that country." The Oregon de-
cedent's sole heirs, residents of East Germany, challenged the state
law because they had been denied inheritance under the law." The
State of Oregon argued that the estate should escheat because the
heirs did not meet Oregon's alien reciprocity requirements.'" The
Oregon Supreme Court, following Clark, held that state law governed
the inheritance of personal property, and, therefore, the heirs could
9° See Clark, 331 U.S. at 516.
91 See id, at 516-18.
92 See id. at 517.
911 See id.
9 ' 1 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
9`' See Id.
% See id. at 430.
97 See id.
" See id. at 430-31.
99 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
100 See id. at 430-31.
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not take the property because East Germany did not grant reciprocal
rights to American citizens."
The Zschernig Court distinguished Clark, finding that state judges
had not simply react foreign nations' laws, but had inquired exten-
sively into the nature of the foreign nations' governments in a man-
ner that demonstrated a bias against communist countries. 102
 This ju-
dicial criticism intruded into the federal government's foreign affairs
power because "it has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may
well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with
those problems."'" Therefore, Oregon's actions had more than an
incidental effect on foreign affairs. 104
In assessing whether a state action has more than an incidental
effect on foreign affairs, the Zschernig Court considered four fac-
tors. 105
 First, the Court examined whether the law required a state
government to inquire extensively into the nature of foreign govern-
ments.m Second, the Court considered whether the state action indi-
cated a bias against certain countries—in other words, led to public
criticism of foreign nations. 107
 By publicly commenting on the nature
of that country, the Court reasoned that those affected countries
might take offense, an offense that could hurt the federal government
in subsequent relations with that country. 108
 Third, the Court consi-
See id. at 431. The alternig Court distinguished Clark based on die content of judi-
cial commentary arising from implementation of the Oregon statute. See id. at 433-34. In
contrast to Clark, the Zschernig Court explicitly reviewed how the statute was being applied
and catalogued judicial findings and comments—concltuling that the state was making
political judgements about specific foreign nations. See id. at 435-40.
102 See id .
103 Id. at 441. The Zschmtig Court did not explain how the slate action directly im-
pacted foreign relations. See id. The Court seemed to Offer three the state
judiciary should not be commenting on the governments of Foreign 1ialions, the judicial
criticism treated foreign countries unequally because of their governmental structure
and/or policies or the foreign government could he 1)11ended by wrongs to its citizens. See
id. The Court allowed that state courts routinely must interpret foreign laws and have ju-
risdiction over foreign citizens. See id. at 433. The Zschernig Court could have decided the
case on preemption, by reinterpreting die 1023 Treaty to apply to personal properly, as tire
Department ollustice requested. or found that the application of the statute was invalid,
but the statute Was not impermissible. See id. at 434. The Court appears to have wanted to
make a broader statement about the treatment of citizens of communist countries. See id,
at 435.
1 °-1 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35.
1 °5 See id. at 433-41.
100 See id. at 433-34.
1°7 See id. at 435.
1 °5 See id. at 441.
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dered if other countries had protested the action. 109 This third factor
served as evidence that the state action affected foreign relations in a
way that could hamper the federal government's future relations with
a foreign country.no Fourth, the Court assessed the likelihood that
other states would act in a similar manlier, increasing the probability
that the United States government would be hampered in the area of
foreign affairs by the state action)"
The Court refused to consider the Department of Justice's state-
ments that the law had no effect on the nation's ability to conduct
foreign affairs, reasoning that the state action could have an effect on
foreign governments that the Executive and, by implication, Congress
had failed to appreciate." 2 For that reason, the wishes of the branches
of government entrusted to formulate foreign policy were dis-
missed)" Justice Stewart, concurring, took an even less deferential
stance towards Executive branch statements supporting the Oregon
law, stating that "Noday, we are told, Oregon's statute does not
conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may." 114 In contrast,
Justice Harlan, concurring only in the judgment, criticized the Zscher-
nig Court for not deciding the case on the narrower preemption
grounds. 115 He further argued that where there is an area of tradi-
tional state competence, such as probate, and there is no conflicting
federal policy or express provision of the Constitution, the state law
should be constitutional on its face." 6
B. Post-Zschernig Supreme Court Decisions Concerning State Action and
Foreign Affairs
Since Zschernig, the Supreme Court has not invoked the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power to invalidate a state or local law." 7 The Court
has addressed, however, claims that state laws impermissibly interfere
log See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34.
Ito See id. at 440.
In See id. at 433-34.
HI See id. at 434-35, 440.
115 See id.
114 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
115 See id. at 443 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
116 See id. at 458-59 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
117 Sec, e.g., Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 11.8 (declining to pass on lower court's dormant
foreign affairs analysis); Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320-31 (declining to discuss a constitutional
argument based on Zschernig); tir.mar4, supra note 7, at 165 (noting that the Supreme
Court has not decided a case using the Dormant Foreign Waits Power since Zschernig).
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with the explicit federal power over foreign commerce. 118
 The Court
has also ruled that federal sanctions have preempted state action
against foreign nations. 119 •
In 1994, in Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme
Court held that a California formula for taxing corporations to in-
clude worldwide revenue did not violate the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 12° In that case, two international corporations with operations
in California argued that the state tax formula, because it had the ef-
fect of taxing income front operations overseas and not just income
earned from California operations, impaired the federal govern-
ment's ability to "speak with one voice" in foreign commerce. 121
 They
further noted that foreign governments had protested this tax. 122
In evaluating whether a state action impacted the "one voice"
standard, the Barclays Court considered whether Congress has implic-
itly or explicitly permitted state action, thereby indicating that state
practices do not impair federal uniformity. 123
 The Court stated that
Congress, through inaction, could "passively indicate that certain state
practices do not impair federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential." 124
 Because the Court had considered a similar
tax challenge eleven years before, and Congress had taken no pre-
emptive action on the matter, the Court implicitly reasoned that the
California tax policy did not offend uniformity of federal policy. 125
The Court further noted that Congress was aware that foreign
governments disliked the tax formula, that Congress had studied the
issues of state taxation of multinational businesses and had failed to
enact several bills prohibiting the California formula. 126 Because Con-
gress had not acted and instead indicated a "willingness to tolerate"
the state action, the Court declined to usurp Congress's decision-
making authority on a foreign policy matter—an area that the Consti-
tution delegated to particular expertise of Congress and the Executive
" 8 See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320-31.
19 Sec Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
12° See 512 U.S. at 330-31.
121 See id. at 302-03.
122 See id. at 324 n.22.
121 See id. at 323.
124 Id. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia
disagree that the Court may infer congressional permission from congressional inaction.
See id. at 331 (151ackninn, 1, concurring), 331-32 (Scalia, J„ concurring).
P25 See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324.
126 See id. at 324-25.
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Branch. 127 Although the Court acknowledged the petitioner's argu-
ment that California's tax formula was "likely to provoke retaliatory
action by foreign governments," the Court found that the complaint
was "directed to the wrong forum," intimating that the complainants
should have sought legislative redress. 128 The Court also refused to
accept that Executive Branch statements against the tax indicated an
impairment of uniformity in foreign policy—stating that the Com-
merce Clause is an enumerated power of Congress. 129 The Court con-
cluded, "the Constitution does not make the judiciary the overseer of
our government." 1" Holding that the tax formula was otherwise le-
gal, the Court deferred to Congress to preempt the law if it impaired
United States foreign policy."'
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the Supreme Court
held that the Massachusetts Burma Law, prohibiting state business
with companies operating in Burma, was preempted by federal sanc-
tions against that country)" Although the lower court had invalidated
the state law as a violation of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, the
Foreign Commerce Clause, as well as an preemption grounds, the
Court reached only the preemption issue—holding that the state law
was preempted because it interfered with the President's ability to
implement federal law in the manner that Congress directed)" Un-
der the federal Burma sanctions, Congress had delegated significant
discretionary power to the President to devise multilateral strategies
towards Burma. 134
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that Barclays mandated
that Congress must explicitly preempt state action touching on for-
eign affairs when Congress was aware of the state action)" Noting
127 .See id. at 327-28.
128 Id. The Court stated: "The judiciary is not vested with the power to decide 'how to
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a
whole to let the States tax as they please.'" Id. at 327-28.
128 See id. at 329. The Court quoted Justice Scalia, "Idle President] is better able to de-
cide than we are which slate regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our
national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor
we were to make that decision, but only Congress." See id. (quoting [Eel Containers 1nel
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
13° Barclays, 512 U.S. at 330-31.
131 See id. at 330-31. "IWJe leave it to Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the Na-
tion's—to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state
autonomy." Id. at 331.
132 See 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
133 See id. at 2294 u.8, 2302.
134 See id. at 2292.
135 See id. at 2301-02.
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that congressional silence is ambiguous, the Court found that Con-
gress's inaction towards state sanctions could be read as an assump-
tion that they were implicitly preempted and not congressional ap-
proval of state action. 136 Furthermore, the Crosby Court noted that the
Supremacy Clause requires a finding of preemption regardless of
whether Congress acknowledges a conflict of state and federal law.'"
The Crosby Court also sought to limit a reading of Barclays that would
dismiss the protests of foreign governments.' 38
 The Court found for-
eign objections to the Massachusetts Burma Law important because
federal sanctions required the President to work with foreign nations
to implement congressional goals. 139
C. Lower Court Interpretations of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
In contrast to the Supreme Court's reticence to decide cases on
the basis of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, lower courts have
grappled with the Zschernig prohibition against state and local action
that has more than an incidental effect on foreign relations.'" Lower
courts have reached contrary conclusions on whether state or mu-
nicipal actions violate the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power."' Whereas
sonic of the state laws reviewed targeted specific countries, either fa-
cially or by application, others mandated a preference for American
products over foreign products. 142
1156 See id.
157 See 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
1 " See id. al 2300-01.
132
 See id.
140 See, e.g., Natsios, 181 E3d at 51-52 (state purchasing law); Board of Th., 562 A.2d at
746 (city divestment ordinance).
141 compare Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52 (unconstitutional), and Tayyari v. New Mexico State
Univ., 495 F. Stipp. 1365. 1380 (1). N.M. 1980) (unconstitutional), and Springfield Rate
Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (111. 1986) (unconstitutional). and
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Commissioners, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229 (Cal. App. 2d
1969) (unconstitutional), with Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913
(3rd Ci•. 1990) (constitutional), and Board of Rs., 562 A.2d at 749 (constitutional), and
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. Ne•iersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n. 381 A.2(1 774, 784
(N.J. 1977) (constitutional).
142 See, e.g., Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45 (statute fitcially targeting Burma); Board of Tis., 562
A.2d at 724 (South Africa); Springfield Ban. Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2d at 302 (South Africa).
Decisions where actions had the effect of targeting a single country include Tayvari v. New
Mexico State Univ.. 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D. N.M. 1980) (Iran) and New York Thnes
Co. v. City of New York Conon'n out Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 903, 9(14 (N.Y 1077)
(South Africa). Decisions addressing laws of genera l application uucl nde Bethlehem Steel, 276
Cal. App. 2d at 223-24 and Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 904; K.S.B. Technical Sales, 381
A.2d at 776.
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In Crosby, the Supreme Court left standing, as dicta, the First Cir-
cuit's 1999 discussion of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power in Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios.143 The First Circuit upheld a
lower court decision invalidating the Massachusetts Burma Law as a
violation of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power."4 The First Circuit
applied the Zschernig threshold test—whether the state action has
"more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations"—and
rejected any balancing test based on federal and state interests. 145
To determine whether the law had more than an incidental ef-
fect, the court looked to the intended and potential impact of the
law. 146 The court found that the only purpose of the law was to change
Burma's human rights policies." 7 The court also concluded that the
law would have a potential effect on foreign affairs because the state
government annually purchases approximately $2 billion of goods
and services and the state's actions might cause other state and local
governments to follow suit. 148 Like the Zschernig Court, the Natsios
court did not view Massachusetts' actions in isolation, but considered
the possible impact on foreign affairs should other state and local
governments enact similar laws. 149 The court also observed that for-
eign countries had protested the law and that the law differed from
federal law in numerous ways, "raising the prospect of embarrassment
for the country." 150
Although acknowledging that the Supreme Court has neither
subsequently invoked Zschernig to invalidate a state law nor clarified its
holding in Zschernig, the First Circuit listed instances where the Su-
preme Court cited Zschernig for general propositions about federal
113 See 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.8.
141 See 181 F.3d at 52. In National Foreign 'Dade Council v. Baker, the district court held
that the Massachusetts Burma Law was unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign Af-
fitirs Clause. See 26 F. Stipp. 2d 287, 292 (D. Mass. 1998). The district court held that the
state law was not preempted by federal action because there was not sufficient conflict
between the state and federal laws. See id. at 293. The district court declined to discuss the
Foreign Commerce Clause challenge. See id.
"5 See Natsios. 181 F.3(1 at 52, 53.
11° See id. at 53-54.
117 See id. at 54.
118 See id. at 53.
145 See id. at 53-54 (noting that the United States has 39,000 non-federal govern-
ments).
15° See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 54. The First Circuit did not recognize that in Zschernig, Bul-
garia was protesting the treatment of its own citizens by a state, unlike the protests directed
at the Massachusetts Burma Law by the European Union and the Association of Southeast
Nations (ASEAN). See id. Here, the targeted country, Burma, did not protest. See id.
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power over foreign affairs. 15' The court similarly declined to entertain
arguments about scholarly criticism of the Zschernig decision.'52
 Sec-
ond, the 'First Circuit also refused to interpret Barclays as implicitly
narrowing the scope of Zscliernig, despite Barclays indication that Con-
gress is the only proper entity to determine whether a state action in-
terferes with foreign affairs.'" Although Barclays discussed the "speak-
ing with one voice test," common to both the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power and Foreign ComMerce Clause the First Circuit found
that Barclays applied only to the Foreign Commerce Clause. 154
 The
First Circuit noted that Barclays did not consider a law that targeted a
single foreign nation or attempted to express foreign policy, but a tax
policy applied to all corporations, 155
Other lower court decisions have invalidated state policies that
target a single country. 156 In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held in
1980 that a New Mexico State University prohibition against admitting
students whose home country permits the holding of U.S. hostages
was an unconstitutional infringement by the state on the federal
power to regulate immigration and to conduct foreign affairs. 157 The
Regents of New Mexico State University, a public entity, instituted this
prohibition in the wake of the hostage crisis between the United
States and Iran. 158
 Iranian students presented three constitutional
Challenges: an equal protection claim, a due process claim and a
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power claim. 159
The court invalidated the Regents's prohibition, ruling for the
Iranian students on both the equal protection and Dormant Foreign
151 see id„
152 See id. al 58-59.
155 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 58-59.
154 see id. at 59. The Natsios Court noted that the parties in Barclays cited to Zschernig in
their briefs and oral arguments, but that the Supreme Court never cited Zschernig in its
decision. The First Circuit interpreted this to mean that the Supreme Court recognized
two distinct doctrinal analyses, the foreign affairs power and the Foreign Commerce




 See Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp. at 1380; Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503 INI,E.2d at 305.
157 See 495 F. Supp. at 1380. The Regents' motion did not explicitly name Iran as the
offending country, but the court found that the motion was directed against Iran. See id. at
1367-68.
158 see id,
159 See id. at 1371,1376. Upon invitation by the district court judge, the United States
filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Iranian students on the issue of Dormant.
Foreign Affairs doctrine, See id. at 1367.
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Affairs questions. 16° In holding that the prohibition violated the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power, the court found great potential for an
effect on international relations because the purpose was a political
statement against Iran in retaliation for the then-pending hostage cri-
sis. 161 The court reasoned that a state entity speaking with anger to-
ward a foreign nation at a time of conflict is different than a private
actor because "it is an action cloaked with the officiality of an arm of
the government of this state." 182 Therefore, considering the potential
for disruption of foreign relations, the court held that the prohibition
against Iranian students was unconstitutional because the policy inter-
fered with the federal government's Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power. 168
Similarly, in 1986,  in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a state law exempting from taxa-
tion all coins but those from South Africa was an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the federal power over foreign affairs. 164 Although
states are generally given great deference in tax policy matters, the
court recognized constitutional limits to this state power.I 65 Citing leg-
islative debate, the court found that the purpose behind the exclusion
was"- "to avoid the appearance of encouraging South African invest-
ment." 188 The court further recognized that some state actions might
be permissible because they have only an incidental effect on foreign
nations, such as an even-handed tax on imported products.I 67 Noting
that "[Ole line of demarcation between incidental and unconstitu-
tional intrusions into foreign affairs is difficult to draw with absolute
precision," the court concluded that because the Illinois act was moti-
vated by disapproval of a single nation's policies, it compromised the
ability of the federal government to speak in one voice and to develop
foreign policy options toward South Africa. 168
160 See id. at 1375,1380.
161 See id. at 1379-80. To buttress its reasoning that the Regents' action invaded the ex-
clusive federal power over foreign affairs, the court noted that the power to regulate im-
migration "rests exclusively with the federal government" and is derived from the Constitu-
tion. See id. at 1376-77. The court, however, concluded that it was the impact on foreign
relations that made the action unconstitutional, not that the action toughed on immigra-
tion. See id. at 1378.
162 livgyari, 495 F. Sum). at 1378.
163 See id. at 1380.
See 503 N.E.2d at 305.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 302.
167 See id. at 306.
168 See Springfield Rape Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
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A state court has also invalidated a state law for violating the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power when it did not target a single foreign
nation. 169 In 1969, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, the
California Court of Appeals for the Second District held unconstitu-
tional a California "Buy American" statute that required California
governmental entities to use domestic prOducts. 170 The California
court interpreted the "Buy American" law as an embargo on foreign
products. 171
 As such, the court found that, under the Dormant For-
eign Affairs Power, the law invaded the exclusive federal power over
trade policy. 172
 The court reasoned that the law was an attempt by the
state to "structure national foreign policy to conform to its own do-
mestic policies." 173
 Because the effect of several states trying to create
trade policy could present an obstacle to the federal government's
ability to maintain national trade policy—similar to the obstacle the
Supreme Court founcl in Zschernig—the court reasoned that the Cali-
fornia "Buy American" law was impermissible under the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power."4
Some lower courts have upheld state laws that may touch on for-
eign affairs as constitutional under the Dormant Foreign Affairs.
Power. 175
 These courts have generally interpreted Clank and Zschernig
to allow some state activity in the foreign affairs area and have sought
more evidence that the law has an actual, as opposed to potential, im-
pact on foreign relations. 176
The only case that examined whether the foreign affairs doctrine
prohibited local divestment laws is the 1989 Maryland Court of Ap-
peals decision Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City.'" In Board of
Trustees, the court held that city ordinances ordering the divestment
of city pension funds from companies that do business in South Africa
do not violate the Dormant Foreign Affairs Clause. 178 Although the
169 See Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 2'29.
170
	 id.
171 See id. at 225.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 229.
174
 See Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal, App. 2d at 228-29.
175
 See Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d al 913; Board of Trs., 562 A.2d at 749; K,S,B. Pchnical
Sales, 381 A.2(1 at 784.
176
 See Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913; Board of Trs., 562 A.2d at 749; K.S.B. Thchn leaf
Sales, 381 A.2d at 784.
177 See 562 A.2d at 74449.
178 See id. at 749. The city ordinance staled that no pension funds shall remain invesied
in, or in the future be invested in. banks or financial institutions that make loans to South
Africa or Namibia or companies "doing business in or with" those countries. See id. at 724.
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court acknowledged that state laws might be struck down as unconsti-
tutional—even though not preempted by federal law—if the state pol-
icy impairs the federal government's constitutional power to conduct
foreign relations, the court noted that Zschernig did not represent an
absolute ban on a state's ability "to take actions involving substantive
judgments about foreign nations." The court observed that, unlike
Zschernig, the divestment statute required no continuous investigation
by a state entity into South Africa's law. 180 Because the pension di-
vestment ordinances were a single statement about a foreign country,
the court reasoned that they were beyond the scope of Zschernig. 181
The court further noted that the city ordinance was a matter of local
concern; the city should not invest its funds "in a manner that was
morally offensive to many Baltimore residents and many beneficiaries
of the pension funds." 82
The court also held that the pension divestment statute, mandat-
ing only the sale of stock of a company doing business in South Africa,
had a minimal or indirect effect on foreign countries and had no
"immediate effect" on the United States' foreign relations with South
Africa. 183 The court, distinguishing the city ordinances from other
cases where an effect on foreign relations was found, noted that the
city was structuring its own financial affairs and was not curtailing the
rights of South Africa, its citizens or any foreign national.'" For these
reasons, the court reasoned, the effect of the ordinances was only
tangential and had a far smaller impact on foreign affairs than the
cases sought to be distinguished. 185
Other courts have also upheld state laws under the foreign affairs
power because they determined that the law has only an incidental
effect on foreign affairs. 186 In 1990, in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Penn-
sylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that a Pennsylvania law requiring public agencies to use steel pro-
duced in the United States did not violate the Constitution)87 in hold-
179 See id. at 744, 746,
' 8° See id.
181 See id.
182 See Board of Trs., 562 A.2d at 744, 746.
183 See id. at 747 (quoting Note, Stale and Municipal Governments React Against the Consti-
tutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985)).
184 See id. at 748.
185 See id.
"6 See Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913; K.S.B. Technical Sales, 381 A.2c1 at 783-84.
187 See 916 F.2d at 913. The law was challenged on preemption, Foreign Commerce
Clause and the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power grounds. See id. at 904.
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ing that the law did not violate the federal government's foreign af-
fairs power, the Third Circuit stated that "any state law that involves
the state in the actual conduct of foreign affairs is unconstitutional,"
but an act that has only an incidental effect is not. 188
 The court distin-
guished the statute from the facts in Zschernig, noting that the law nei-
ther facially nor by effect allowed state administrative or court officials
to comment on or base their decisions on the conduct of foreign re-
gimes; the statute required that all foreign steel be treated the
same. 189 The court further reasoned that the mere possibility that the
restriction might become a topic of international dispute was not
sufficient to invalidate the statute, especially because Congress was
aware of these state restrictions and had not preempted them."9
Therefore, invalidation would amount to a 'judicial redirection of
established foreign trade policy—a quite inappropriate exercise of the
judicial power:19 i
Similarly, in 1977, in KS.B. Technical Sales Corp. u North Jersey Dis-
trict Water Supply Commission, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld
a state "Buy American" law as permissible under the foreign affairs
power."' Because the New Jersey law did not single out foreign na-
tions for their political ideologies and the law was not motivated by a
country's particular actions, the court held that Zschernig did not pre-
chide the New Jersey "Buy American" law. 193
 The court noted, how-
ever, that "if refined inquiries into foreign ideologies entered into the
decision to apply or not to apply the condition, there would, of
course, be little difficulty in finding a constitutional infirmity of the
type condemned in Zschernig." 194
 The court explicitly rejected the rea-
soning of Bethlehem Steel stating that Zschernig and Clark permit some
state action that impacts foreign affairs if it does not have a demon-
strable impact on foreign relations. 195
"8 See id. at 913. In using the tern' "actual conduct," the Third Circuii appea•s to lake
a narrower approach to the issue of incidental effect, limiting the ability of a party to argue




191 See id. at 914.
192 See 381 A.2(1 at 789. The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that die law was not
preempted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and was not prohibited tinder
the Commerce Clause. See id.
193 See id. at 783-84.
194 Id. at 784.
195 See id.
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One lower court decision failed to reach majority consensus on
the issue of the constitutionality of a law under the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power. 196 In 1977, in New York Times Co. v. city of New York Com-
mission on Human Rights, the New York Court of Appeals held that ad-
vertisements for employment in South Africa appearing in the New
York Times were not a violation of New York City anti-discrimination
laws. 197 The New York Times had appealed a ruling by the City of New
York Commission on Human Rights(the "Commission") that an ad-
vertisement for employment in South Africa violated a city ordinance
against discrimination because of South Africa's racially discrimina-
tory employment laws. 198
Three judges agreed that the Commission's ruling sought to im-
pose an economic boycott of the South African government and,
therefore, was an impermissible encroachment of the federal gov-
ernment's foreign affairs power that potentially could embarrass the
nation's foreign policy if other localities acted similarly.'" The dissent,
in contrast, reasoned that the foreign affairs 'doctrine only prevented
state courts "from inquiry into the validity of acts of a foreign gov-
ernment done within its own territory." 200 The dissent noted that the
Commission was neither engaged in an economic boycott nor deter-
mining the rights of South Africans in this country and, in the ab-
sence of a federal policy on point, New York was not required to ac-
quiesce to the cliscrimiiiation of South Africa when done in the
United States. 201
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND
ITS APPLICATION TO STATE AND LOCAL INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
IMPACTING FOREIGN NATIONS
The foreign affairs power, as articulated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Zschernig, represents a barrier to state and mu-
nicipal actions that implicate foreign affairs. 202 Where exactly this bar-
196 See New York Times, 361 N.E.211 al 969 (,]ones, J., concurring).
197 See id. at 967-68.
198 See id. at 965-66.
I" See id. at 968. Three judges joined the majority decision. Two judges concurred with
the majority with respect to the definition of discriminatory expression but failed to reach
the foreign affairs doctrine issue. Two judges dissented in entirety. See id. at 973.
200 See id. at 972 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
201 See New York Times, 361 N.E.2d at 972-73 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
202 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,441 (1968).
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rier lies, however, is uncertain. 20
 The doctrine does not present a
clear standard by which states and municipalities can determine the
constitutionality of their actions. 2" As states and municipalities be-
come more like any other major United States economic actor, i.e., a
global market participant, the need for a clear standard becomes
more pressii 10°5
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue since
Zschernig was decided in 1968, the majority of lower court cases have
followed Zschernig closely, invalidating laws, in particular, that target
specific nations. 206
 In its broadest articulation, as most courts have in-
terpreted Zschernig, the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power would render
almost any state and local statements about policies of foreign nations
or actions touching on foreign affairs unconstitutional.207
 Iii contrast,
if Zschernig is more narrowly construed, many of these state actions
could be held constitutional. 208
A. The Scope of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Majority and Minority
Interpretations
As a basic principle, there can be little dispute that the federal
government should articulate official American foreign policy. 209 The
foreign affairs doctrine, as expressed in Zschernig, however, precludes
any state or local action that has more than an incidental or indirect
effect on foreign affairs. 21 ° Thus, the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
reaches beyond state and local laws that are in conflict with official
United States foreign policy to state and local laws and actions that
2U3 See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d. 38, 51-52 (1st Ch. 1909),
aff' sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ci.• 2288. 2290-91 (2000);
Board of 7)s. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 746 (Md. 1987); see alsOLuschin & An-
derson, supra note 71, at 400 (describing the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power as "amor-
phous").
2G4
 Compare Zsehernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41 (invalidating state probate law), with Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (upholding state probate law).
205 See supra notes 26-70 and accompanying text (describing how state and local pen-
sion funds impact foreign affairs).
2" See supra notes 140-201 and accompanying text.
207 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35; Nalsios, 181 F.3(1 at 52; Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp. at
1380; Sprineield Rare Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2d at 305; Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at
229.
" See "Trojan 'Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, Old F.2d at 913; Board of 7is„ 562 A,2c1 at
749; A:S.13 Thchnical Sales, 381 A.2d at 784.
2" See United Stales v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J. concurring);
United States v, Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937).
2 lo See 389 U.S. at 434-35,
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have some effect on the United States' ability to conduct foreign af-
fairs.2 II
The two main Supreme Court cases in this area, Zschernig and to
a lesser extent Clark, when read together, raise questions about the
scope of the foreign affairs power.212 Although Zschernig did not ex-
plicitly overrule Clark, Clark's balancing test, weighing the state's in-
terest in areas of traditional local concern against the impact on for
eign affairs has been sub silento overruled by Zschernig.213 Zschernig
implicitly replaces the Clark balancing test with a threshold test: any
activity, regardless of the state interest in that area, that has more than
an incidental effect on foreign affairs is unconstitutional. 2" If the
state activity exceeds some threshold level—i.e., Zschemies routine
reading of foreign laws—the state has violated the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power. 215
Zschernig does not explain where this threshold level lies, and the
Supreme Court, at least under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power,
has not clarified this test. 216 Lower courts have, however, grappled
with this line. 217 The courts examine two factors: whether the law or
action impacts foreign affairs and whether the impact is more than
incidentaI. 218
First, the lower courts have examined whether the state action
touches on foreign affairs. 219 A majority of courts have concluded that
211 See id. at 434-35, 440-41; see also HENKEN, supra note 7, at 163-64 (noting that the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power applies even where Congress has not acted); Ramsey, supra
note 75, at 352 (noting Court statements about foreign affairs power indicate that "states
as a general matter lack power to pass laws with international implications").
212 Compare Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41, with Clark, 331 U.S. at 517. See also liENKIN,
•5t4Pra 1101C 7, at 164 ("[It] may take many years and many cases, to develop the distinctions
and draw the lines that will define the Zsche•niglimitations on the states.").
213 See 389 U.S. at 433-35, 440-41; 331 U.S. at 516-18.
214 See 389 U.S. at 440-41; see also Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52 (interpreting Zscheritig as estab-
lishing a threshold, not balancing, lest). But see Lewis, supra note 6, at 509 (advocating a
balancing test of stale and federal interests).
213 See 389 U.S. at 434-35.
216 See id. at 440-41; see also Nalsios, 181 F.3d at 51-52 ("The precise boundaries of the
Supreme Court's holding in Zschernig are unclear."); HENK1N, supra note 7, at 165 (noting
the Supreme Court has not decided any subsequent cases under the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power).
217 Compare Musios, 181 F.3d at 52 (unconstitutional), and Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp. at 1380
(unconstitutional), and Sprineeld Rare Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2t1 at 305 (unconstitutional),
and Bethlehem Steel, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 229 (unconstitutional), with Trojan Technologies, 916
F.2d at 913-14 (constitutional), and Board of Tn., 562 A.2d at 749 (constitutional), and
K.S•B. Technical Sales, 381 A.2d at 784 (constitutional).
218 See supra notes 140-201 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 140-201 and accompanying text.
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state actions that target a specific foreign nation by name or effect or
that discriminate against products made abroad touch on foreign af-
fairs—even though the action may be directed at United States com-
panies and affect a foreign nation only indirectly. 220
 Foreign affairs is
a broader category of activity than foreign policy—it need only touch
on countries outside of the United States. 221 The determinative issue
as to the constitutionality of a state action under the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power, therefore, is whether the law has more than an inciden-
tal effect on foreign affairs. 222
In applying the "more than incidental" test, lower courts ad-
dressed the four Zschernig factors: state inquiry into foreign nations,
demonstrated bias toward foreign nations, protests by other nations,
and potential for other sub-national governments to act similarly. 223
Unlike Zschernig, where the law itself was not motivated by a desire to
criticize foreign governments, but led inevitably to criticism by state
courts, most lower courts invalidating state action under the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power determined that the law itself criticized foreign
countries. 224 Therefore, their application of the Dormant Foreign Af-
fairs Power analysis has condensed the first two factors that. the Court
considered in Zschernig 225
 The lower courts examined if the state law
or action was a critical inquiry into the nature of foreign governments
demonstrating a bias against a foreign country. 226
 If the purpose be-
hind the law was to encourage a change in that country's behavior,
then, according to lower court interpretations, it satisfied the Zschernig
test. 227
In the cases that did not invalidate a law under the Dormant For-
eign Affairs Power, the courts have found that the law had neither the
220 See supra notes 140-174 and accompanying text. But see Board of Trs,, 562 A.2d at 748
(noting that law did not impact foreign countries or their citizens directly and had no
impact on foreign affairs); New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comin'n on Human
Rights, 361 N.E.26 963, 973 (N.Y. 1977) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Commission's decision did not violate the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power becat toe it im-
pacted New York Corporations, not South Africa).
221 See Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 1632-33.
222 See Zsehernig, 389 U.S. at 434-35,440-41.
223 See Natsios, 181 F3d at 53; Tayyari, 495 F. Snpp. at 1379-80: Springfield Rare Coin Gal-
leries, 503 N.E.2d at 307.
224 See supra notes 143-168 and acronym tying text.
225 See supra notes 143-168 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 143-168 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 143-168 and accompanying text. But see New York Times, 361 N.E.2d
at 972 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (finding no effect on foreign affairs because Commission
was not reviewing South African laws).
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purpose nor effect of criticizing other nations. 228 For example, in up-
holding "Buy American" laws, lower courts concluded that the laws
did not criticize or demonstrate a bias toward a given country. 229
Therefore, lower courts have held that the decision on the first two
Zschernig factors, inquiry and criticism of foreign governments, is de-
cisive of the issue of constitutionality of state and local action touch-
ing on foreign affairs. 23°
The remaining two factors considered in Zschernig—protests by
foreign nations and the likelihood that other states and municipalities
would follow suit—have not been interpreted as determinative of the
constitutionality of state or local action. 231 Instead, these factors rein-
force suspicions about the potential negative impact on the federal
government's ability to deal with foreign countries. 232 For example,
the court in Natsios cited protests by United States trading partners
and the potential for many such anti-Burma laws—shown by the fact
that nineteen municipalities had already enacted similar laws—as fur-
ther evidence, but not a dispositive factor, that the law could effect
foreign affairs. 233
Although a foreign country's protest is easily established as a mat-
ter of fact, the likelihood of other states and localities acting similarly
reveals the speculative nature of the Zschernig analysis. 234 The ability of
other state and local governments to act similarly creates the pre-
sumption that the action in question will have a negative impact on
foreign affairs. 235 This presumption is difficult to rebut because, un-
der Zschemig, courts should not consider statements by the Executive
branch or Congress that the law does not have an effect on the fed-
eral government's ability to conduct foreign affairs. 236 Therefore,
once a court has made a finding that the state or local action criticizes
226 See supra notes 177-195 and accompanying text.
2 '29 See, e.g., K.S.B. Technical Sales, 381 A.2(1 at 783-84 (noting that the "Buy American"
law did not single out countries based on ideology).
236 See Nalsios, 181 F.3d at 53; Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913; Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp.
at 1379-80; KS.B. Technical Sales, 381 A.2(1 at 783-84; Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503
N.E.2d at 307.
231 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 47, 53-55; see also Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp. at 1376-80 (holding
state action unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power without finding
protests from foreign countries or potential for similar action by other states or munici-
palities); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2d at 304-08 (same).
232 See Nalsios, 181 F.3d at 47,53-55.
233 See id. at 47,55.
234 See id. at 53.
235 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53-54.
236 See 389 U.S. at 434-35.
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foreign nations and concluded that other states or localities could act
similarly—an easy leap unless the questioned activity is somehow
unique to that state or locality—Zschernig leaves states and localities no
defense for their actions. 237
An analysis of the majority of lower courts interpretations of
Zschernig demonstrates that the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power cre-
ates a broad prohibition against states and municipalities entering the
area of foreign affairs. 2 g8
 If a state or local action identifies a foreign
country by name or discriminates between the United States and for-
eign countries, then the law or action implicates foreign affairs. 2" The
state or local action is unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect
of criticizing foreign countries' policies in a manner that would dem-
onstrate a bias against that country by treating it differently than
other foreign nations.240
Despite the fact that Zschernig and its progeny have interpreted
the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power broadly, as an almost per se re-
striction against state activity implicating foreign affairs, two alterna-
tive interpretations of this power are possible, 241 First, the role of Clark
and its considerations of local concerns could be more closely fol-
lowed.242 Board of Trustees follows this approach. 243
 Second, the Su-
preme Court has articulated a more deferential approach towards
state and local action under the Foreign Commerce Clause than tin-
der Zschernig244 In particular, Barclays offers a means to mitigate the
near absolute ban against states and localities engaging in activities
implicating foreign affairs. 245
The Board of Trustees approach differs from the strict 7sthernig
analysis on several crucial points. 246
 First, Board of Trustees maintains
the Clark balancing of traditional areas of local concern. 247
 Second,
Board of Trustees focuses on the laws' direct impact on countries and
foreign nationals, and not laws that touch on foreign countries indi-
237 See id. at 434-35,440-41.
23e See supra notes 143-174 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 143-201 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 143-179,107-201 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 120-131, 177-185 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 85-03,177-185 and accompanying text,
243 See supra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
244 See SitPra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
245 See 512 U.S. at 327-28.
246 See 562 A.2d at 744-40: see also Lewis, supra note (1, at 507-17 (advocating a balanc-
ing test).
247 See 562 A.2d at 744-40.
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rectly.20 Third, the Board of Trustees approach looks to the actual im-
pact that the law has on foreign relations and does not speculate
about potential cumulative state action. 249 Therefore, state or munici-
pal actions that express local concern and do not directly target a for-
eign country or its citizens would be constitutional. 23°
Although this approach may be more practical than an absolute
ban on state activity impacting foreign nations, Supreme Court
precedent does not support it. 251 First, Board of Trustees gives too much
consideration to areas of local concern.252 The Dormant Foreign Af-
fairs Power, as articulated in Zschernig, is not a balancing test between
state and federal interests. 253 By invalidating such a similar inheritance
law, Zschernig did not support reading traditional areas of state con-
cern as a permissible exception to the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power. 254
Second, the Board of Trustees approach attempts, unconvincingly,
to distinguish the South Africa divestment ordinance from the facts in
Zschernig.255 Although Zschernig did address a situation where foreign
nationals actually suffered injury by the state action, and the South
Africa divestment ordinance arguably did not directly injure foreign
nationals, the overriding concern of the Zschernig court was the nega-
tive commentary on foreign government5. 256 By rejecting investment
opportunities in South Africa because of apartheid, Baltimore en-
gaged in a very public criticism of a foreign government. 257 This legis-
lative criticism impacts many companies, and is perhaps even more
248 See id. at 746.
2.0 See id. at 748.
250 See id. at 744-49,
251 See Price & Hannah, supra note 6, at 494 (rejecting Board of Tts.' interpretation of
Zschernig); Ramsey, mina note 75, at 361 ("Mhe campaign to limit Zschernigto its facts has
failed adequately to explain its rationale.").
252 See 562 A.2d at 748.
255 See 389 U.S. at 434-35; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 52.
2m Compare Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41 (invalidating a state probate law even though
probate -%vas an area of traditional state concern), with Clark, 331 U.S. at 516-18 (uphold-
ing a similar state probate law, in part, because probate was a traditional area of local con-
cern),
255 Compare Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435-40 (detailing state court statements about condi-
tions in comm unist countries), with Board of To., 562 A.2d at 724 n.6 (detailing legislative
history of ordinance anti previous attempts at enacting measures that indicate law was
designed to support ending apartheid in South Africa).
250 See 389 U.S. at 435-41.
257 See Board of ns., 562 A.2d al 724 n.6.
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offensive than a probate court's criticism impacting a few individu-
als. 258
Filially, Board of Trustees focuses, albeit sensibly, on the actual im-
pact of the local activity and not the speculative impact of possible
action by other states and municipalities. 259
 The court concluded that
the city ordinance had no effect on the federal government's ability to
conduct foreign affairs. 260 Zschernig, however, does not allow a court to
ignore the interplay of states and localities enacting similar meas-
ures. 261
Another alternative Dormant Foreign Affairs Power analysis in-
corporates statements that the Supreme Court has made in its Foreign
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 262
 Because the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause power
both restrict state action impairing federal authority over foreign of
 the standards should be similar. 263
 The federal government's
foreign affairs power implicitly includes actions implicating the nar-
rower Foreign Commerce Clause, therefore, a state activity should not
be permissible under the narrower Foreign Commerce Clause and
impermissible under the broader foreign affairs power. 264
 Although in
Barclays, the Court analyzed the claim under the Foreign Commerce
Clause and did not address Zschernig or the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power, the Court's analysis of the problem resembled a Dormant For-
eign Affairs Power analysis. 265
 The Court focused on the potential im-
2" See generally Price & Hannah, supra note 6, at 493-94.
259 See 562 A.2d at 747.48.
260 See id. at 749.
21 See 389 U.S. at 433-34.
262
 Sre supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
2° See HENKIN, supra note 7, at 162 (noting that the Supreme Court has not discussed
foreign commerce under the larger" power over foreign affairs); Thum supra note 71,
§ 6-24, at 1153-154 (including discussion of Zsrlu'rnig within the section of his treatise on
the Foreign Commerce Clause).
26. 1
 See, e.g., Board of Trs„ 562 A.2d at 744 11.50 (noting that Foreign Commerce Clause
analysis and foreign affairs doctrine analysis are closely related and die Foreign Commerce
Clause "seems no More than a slice of the foreign relations pie") (gum* Peter J. Spiro,
Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign
Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813,832 (1086)).
2° See id. at 320-31; sec also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41 (citing unilOrmity of federal
government in foreign affairs as its primary concern); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc.
v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300,305-06 (Ill. 1986) (applying the "one voice" test to the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power)• AltItough anal yz ing the impact of the MassacItusens law on
the ability of the President to execute a federal statute, the Crosby Court echoed the scone
concerns raised in a dormant foreign affairs analysis. See 120 S. Ct. at 2998. "It is not
merely that the differences between the state and federal Acts in scope and type of sanc-
tions threaten to complicate the discussions; they compromise the very capacity of the
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pact of the state law on the federal government's ability to interact
with foreign countries. 266 Because the Barclays Court discussed the
impact of state action on the federal government extensively, albeit in
a Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, the decision may be important
to any future Dormant Foreign Affairs Power analysis. 267
In Barclays, the. Supreme Court held that where Congress was
aware of the state action, but had failed to act, the Court could not
find that the state had impaired the federal government's ability to
speak with one voice in foreign policy. 268 In that sense, Barclays could
be interpreted to overrule Zschernig's ban against considering the
statements of the federal government in evaluating whether the state
or local action had an impact on the federal government's ability to
conduct foreign relations. 269 At its root, Barclays is a decision about
the interplay of the federal branches and the judiciary's lack of com-
petence in the area of foreign affairs, 27° The great deference that the
judiciary affords Congress in the area of foreign commerce seems to
render the concept that the federal government has an exclusive
power over foreign affairs a truism, but not a judicially enforceable
limit on ,state power.271 Although Crosby appeared to limit Barclays'
holding, the Court, by analyzing the issue under preemption, still
looked to congressional action to determine whether the state action
was permissible.272
Barclays and Zschernig reached diametrically opposed conclusions
about the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs issues, buttressing ar-
guments that Barclays should have overruled Zschernig. 273 The Zschernig
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments." See
id.
26° See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 311.
267 See id. at 320-31. The "one voice" standard was first expressed in Pink to describe
generally the relationship between state and federal power in matters cancer g foreign
affairs. See 315 U.S. at 242 (Frankintier, J., concurring). Because Pink was ultimately de-
cided on preemption grounds, there is no reason to limit the "one voice" standard to For-
eign Commerce Clause cases. See 315 U.S. at 234.
268 See 512 U.S. at 323,324,330-31. Bud see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120
S. Ct. 2288,2302 (2000) (rejecting that Congress's failure to preempt indicated Congress's
endorsement of state sanctions).
269 See 512 U.S. at 328-31.
27°
 See Id.
271 See id. at 330—'31.
272 See 120 S. Ct. at 2302.
273 Compare Barclays, 512 U.S. at 328-31 (deferring to Congress's inaction on foreign
affairs issue), with Zschernig. 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring) (refusing to defer to
Executive Branch statements about foreign affairs issue). In Crosby, however, the Supreme
Court noted that preemption analysis is a matter of constitutional interpretation and,
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Court argued that the state action could have an effect on foreign
governments that the Executive and, by implication, Congress had
failed to appreciate. 274
 For that reason, the wishes of the branches of
government entrusted to formulate foreign policy were .dismissed.275
The Supreme Court rejected this type of judicial activism in Bar-
clays.276 Effectively, this makes Zschernies presumption that a state ac-
tivity has an impact on foreign affairs rebuttable upon a showing that
Congress has considered, but failed to act in this area: 277
 Further-
more, by declining to consider other nations' protests or retaliatory
action, because Congress, not courts, should determine United States
foreign policy, the Barclays Court, in essence, told the multi-nationals
challenging the California tax law to. find a political, not constitu-
tional solution to their problem. 278 Although the Crosby decision did
consider statements of foreign governments, it would not be appro-
priate for the judiciary to consider foreign governments' statements
where Congress had not considered them or where, as in Crosby, Con-
gress had not enacted a foreign policy scheme that required the
President to work with other nations, 279
The Barclays alternative could allow state or local action touching
on foreign affairs unless Congress had explicitly or implicitly pre-
empted the action. 2" Barclays, however, dealt with a state tax for-
umla, 281
 The law in question did not single out specific foreign coun-
tries for criticism nor did it allow for the discriminatory treatment of
some entities based on the countries in which they operated.282 Fur-
thermore, it concerned state tax policy, an area that the court has al-
ways considered to be of traditional local concern.281
 Barclays does not
clarify if a court should only defer to Congress's preemptive abilities if
therefore, there is no requirement that Congress expressly preempt stale action, See 120 S.
Ct. at 2302.
271 See 389 U.S. at 440-41.
275 See id. Justice Stewart, concurring, went further, responded that the executive
branch could not anticipate the future impact of these state laws. See 389 U.S. at 443 (Stew-
art. J., concurring).
276 See 512 U.S. at 328-31.
277 See id,
278 See id. at 327-28 (noting that the companies' complaints to the judiciary were di-
rected at the wrong forum).
276 Sec id.
288 See id. at 327-28.
281 See 512 U.S. at 302-03.
282 See id. at 302-03.
283 See id. at 327 ii.28.
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a law is non-country speCific in its application and the state action is
in an area of traditional local concern. 284
The three alternative views of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
analysis present varying degrees of deference towards state or local
activity touching on foreign affairs. 285 The first, most widely accepted,
formulation of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, establishes what is
essentially a per se rule against state or local activity in this area. 286 A
state cannot criticize foreign nations. 287 The second formulation,
adopted only in Board of Trustees, would allow state or local action if
the action expresses a state interest, indirectly relates to a foreign na-
tion and does not have an actual impact on foreign relations. 288 The
third approach, incorporating tests developed under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, would allow state or local activity unless the action
was disavowed expressly or implicitly by Congress. 289 This approach,
however, may be limited to areas that the Court considers traditionally
local and actions that do not identify a specific foreign country. 29°
B. The Constitutionality of State Investment Restrictions Under Majority and
Alternative Formulations of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
The three approaches to the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power lead
to different conclusions about the constitutionality of state and local
investment restrictions touching on foreign countries. 291 This section
analyzes divestment mandates, reporting requirements, shareholder
resolutions and investment choices. 292
Under the strict approach to state or local action touching on
foreign affairs adopted in Zschernig and most subsequent cases, all in-
vestment restrictions identifying a foreign nation would be considered
an unconstitutional violation of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power. 293
The only exception is a routine reading of foreign laws by a state
2" See id. at 330 (noting that tax formula was non-discriminatory); see also Denning
McCall, supra note 41, at 338-39 (arguing that state divestment laws are unconstitutional
under Foreign Commerce Clause).
285 See supra notes 209-284 and accompanying text. But see Ramsey, supra note 75, at
346 (arguing that there is no Dormant Foreign Affairs Power).
286 See supra notes 209-240 kind accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 209-240 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 246-260 mid accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 268-284 and accompanying text.
2'3° See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 330.
291 See supra notes 209-290 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 209-240 and accompanying text.
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court and, possibly, the routine application of a state policy that does
not evidence criticism of a foreign nation. 294
 Because all of the above
mentioned investment restrictions mention a foreign country by
name or allow for disparate treatment of foreign countries in relation
to the United States, they touch on foreign affairs and invoke Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power scrutiny—whether the investment restric-
tions have "more than [an] incidental effect" test of the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power. 295
In the case of divestment activity, states and localities are target-
ing countries for divestment because they disagree with the policies
enacted by foreign governments. 296
 These initiatives particularly focus
on the human rights record of the country. 297
 Indeed, were it not for
a foreign country's policies, the state or municipality would not seek
to divest itself from companies doing business there. 298
 Divestment
proposals are economic boycotts of countries designed to encourage a
change hi their policies, similar to other state economic boycotts that
lower courts have held unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Fower. 2" Although the nature of the state or local action—es-
sentially economic boycott in response to a perceived foreign gov-
ernment failure—is sufficient to render a divestment statute unconsti-
tutional under the foreign affairs power, states and municipalities do
not act in isolation when enacting these divestment proposals."° As
evidenced by the South Africa campaign, and to a lesser extent, the
Burma campaign, divestment laws tend to be passed en masse, after
one state, or municipality enacts a law, others tend to follow. 301
 There-
fore, divestment statutes carry all of the traits that the Zschernig Court
determined to be decisive in evaluating whether a state or local action
was unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.302
2" See supra notes 102-104 mid accompanying text.
2" .See supra times 209-240 and accompanying text.
299 See DESISIUNE A Molts, .supra note 37, at 2,17-22.
297
 See id. at 1-2.
2°5 See id.
299 See Natsios, 181 F.3(1:1( 53 ("I TI he design and intent oldie law is to affect Ilse affairs
of a foreign country."); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503 N.E.2d at 307 ("I 'Ellie practical
effect of the exclusion is to impose, or at least encourage, an economic boycott of the
South African Krugerrand.").
mxi See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
501
 See, e.g., DitSinioNE & MosEs. sulwa note 37. at 17-22 (describing stale and local ac-
tivity regarding South Africa); USA ENGAGE, SHIMI note 45 (describing state and local acti•-
ity regarding Burma).
512 See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
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Laws requiring states and municipalities to report on businesses'
compliance with the MacBride Principles do not mandate divestment
and, therefore, are not like economic boycotts. 303 Even so, through
their reporting requirements, states and municipalities seek to high-
light publicly the inequitable treatment of foreign nationals within a
foreign country. 304 They are a means to raise awareness about the
conditions in a foreign country. 305,Because they implicitly state that a
foreign country has failed to enact proper measures to ensure the ac-
ceptable treatment of its citizens, they are a criticism of a foreign
country. 306 Although . the effect on the foreign country may not be as
severe as an economic boycott and, therefore, do not raise the specter
of retaliatory action to the same extent, the measures still criticize
foreign countries.307 Additionally, the plethora of similar state and lo-
cal measures raises, under Zschernig, the possibility that the federal
government's foreign relations with these countries will be affected."8
Therefore, they would be similarly unconstitutional under the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power. 309
Shareholder resolutions may mandate a company's divestment
from a country or may require its compliance with certain business
practices when operating overseas.") Because the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power, as articulated in Zschernig, is not limited to state laws,
but encompasses any state action, participation in shareholder resolu-
tions is susceptible to Dormant Foreign Affairs Power scrutiny."'
Many states, however, establish voting practices on some issues by
law.312 Where a state statute treats a resolution differently based on a
foreign country, the statute implicates the same issues as a divestment
statute and would be similarly unconstitutional. 313 If the state, without
statutory guidance, spearheads a resolution naming a particular coun-
try, the resulting state criticism is the same as if the state had enacted
3°3 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
3c)-1 See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 5, at 6-8 (describing
history of the MacBride Principles as a means to encourage equitable treatment of Catho-
lics and Protestants in Northern Ireland).
3"3 See id. at 6-8,109-51.
306 See Aupra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 47-52 iind accompanying text.
3"8 See supra notes 47-52,94-116 and accompanying text.
30'' See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text:
311 See 389 U.S. at 433-34.
312 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing laws specilOng how a state should
vote in shareholder resolutions on issues relating to Northern Ireland and South Africa).
313 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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a statute. 314
 Because the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power precludes
state action criticizing a country, any vote on a shareholder resolution,
whether initiated by the state or not., would -be unconstitutional. 315
Some shareholder resolutions seek to force companies to adopt
generic human tights treatment when the company decides to con-
duct business abroad. 316
 To the extent that the company is criticizing a
foreign country, and the state is not in any way evaluating a foreign
country, a state vote on this type of shareholder resolution would be
constitutional. 317
 A similar generic human tights code adopted by a
state to evaluate its investment portfolio, where the state would then
make a list of acceptable and unacceptable countries in which com-
panies it does business with can invest, would be, however, unconstitu-
tional.3 " This policy would require states to engage in country-by-
country criticisms of the type specifically forbidden by Zschernig.319
Investment decisions based on more traditional investment risk
criteria may touch on foreign affairs because the decision is comment-
ing on a foreign government's policies—similar to the type of criti-
cism with which Zschernig was concerned. 520 Criticism of economic
policies could have potentially even more impact on a foreign gov-
ernment than criticism of its human rights policies because they
might affect the behavior of other investors, 321
 Because Zschernig did
not indicate any reason to distinguish criticism of a foreign govern-
314 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34; see also Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53 (listing fitctors in-
cluding intent to change policies, economic power of state, and potential for other states
to act similarly). These factors would also he common to shareholder resolutions. See gener-
13radford, supra note 1, at 41142.
313
 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34; Natsios, 181 F.3c1 at 53; see also Price & Hannah, su-
pra note 6, al 464 (arguing Zschernig applies to all local government mitts because it con-
cerned state intrusions into federal domain generally).
316 See supra note 60 and accompanying taxi.
3" See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-40 (describing criticism by state actors as offensive);
Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53-54 (same).
318 See supra note 65 and accompanying text,
319 See, supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
32° See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434-40; IIENKiN, supra note 7, at 164 (aguing that even if
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is limited to slate actions critical of foreign governments, it
still "might cast doubts on the right of the states to apply their own 'public policy' in trans-
national situations"); Chernoff, supra note 65, at 25; Hemmerick, supra note 64, at 1; Ma-
honey, supra note 67, at 2738. In contrast, Lewis argues that slates rats avoid invalidation by
showing that it considered politically neutral factors, such as investment risk. See Lewis,
supra
 note 6, at 514. Lewis, however, maintains the minority position that the 1)0111;1m
Foreign AlPairs Power uses a balancing test Of state and federal concerns to determine if a
state action is constitutional. See id. at 509.
321
 See generally FRY, supra note 35, at 3-9 (describing power of state governments in
global economy)•
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nient's economic policies from its human rights policies, states and
local investment decisions are a type of state action directed at a for-
eign country's policies that Zsthernig would prohibit. 322
Under a strict view of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, most
state and local investment restrictions touching on foreign affairs
would be unconstitutiona1, 323 . Where the state activity, whether im-
plemented by law or policy, touches on foreign affairs in a manner
critical of the internal workings of a foreign nation, the strict inter-
pretation would preclude such activity. 324 Of the types of investment
restrictions considered, only ones that do not allow the state itself to
criticize a foreign government would be permissible under the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power. 325
The two alternate interpretations of the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power might permit more state and local investment restrictions. 326
These alternate approaches, the Board of Trustees approach and the
Barclays approach, preserve the ability of states and municipalities to
restrict their investments based on considerations that implicate for-
eign affairs. 327 Their authority in relation to Zschernig, however, is un-
clear. 323
The first alternative approach, as set out in Board of Trustees,
would allow any state or local activity that did not directly affect for-
eign governments or foreign citizens. 329 Under this formulation, state
investment activity is an area of local concern. 390 So long as the restric-
tion only affected company behavior, and did not directly apply to
countries, then the policy would be permissible. 331 Because all of the
above investment restrictions—divestment, reporting on companies'
business practices abroad and shareholder resolutions—focus on
companies' behavior and do not directly apply to countries or their
322 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text; see also Loschin Sc Anderson, supra
note 71, at 401 (noting that "in the normal course of business, states inevitably affect the
lives of foreign nationals, companies, and governments").
32l
	 supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 24G-250,268-280 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 246-250,268-280 and accompanying text.
328 See, e.g., Nalsios, 181 F.3d at 54-50 (rejecting arguments based on Barclays and Board
of Trs.).
329 See supra notes 246-250 and accompanying text.
339
 See supra notes 246-25(1 and accompanying text.
331 See supra notes 246-250 and accompanying text; see also New York Times, 361 N.E.2d
at 972 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (noting difference between action against U.S. corpora-
tions and foreign countries).
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citizens, they would be constitutional under this interpretation of the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power. 332
 Investment decisions about politi-
cal or economic risk also would focus primarily on companies. 333 This
permissive approach, however, has not been followed by other lower
courts, and indeed, is not supported by Zschernig. 334
The third approach to the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is to
adopt criteria the Supreme Court established in Barclays for the For-
eign Commerce Clause area—a law is constitutional if Congress con-
sidered, but failed to preempt state or local action. 335
 A presumed in-
cursion into the federal government's exclusive power over foreign
affairs, such as a divestment initiative, can be deemed constitutional if
a state or locality can prove that Congress considered, but did not act
on the issue, and in no other way preempted the state action. 336
 Con-
gress is aware, and has not acted against, social investing by public
pension funds in response to foreign countries' human rights viola-
tions. 337
 In the 1980s, Congress debated but failed to enact any meas-
ure preventing states from this type of activity. 338
 Therefore, because
of congressional acquiescence, state and local investment restrictions
would be constitutional under this interpretation of the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power. 339
 The constitutionality of shareholder resolu-
tions and investment decisions would similarly turn on whether Con-
gress implicitly or explicitly acquiesced to state and local action. 340
Crosby would further limit this approach by preempting state sanctions
where Congress had enacted sanctions against the target nation but
did not expressly invalidate state sanctions. 341
"2 See SUPra notes 246-250 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra notes 246-250 and accompanying text.
331 See 389 U.S. al .434-35,440-41; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 55-56 (invalidating slate law un-
der the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power Nvhen law was directed at companies); Nero Pod(
Times, 361 N.E.2d at 968 (failing to differentiate between corporations and companies);
Price & Hannah, supra note 6, at 492-94 (arguing Board of Trs. misinterpreted the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Power); Ramsey, supra note 75, at 301-62 (arguing that Board of Ds, is
unsupported by Zschernig).
339
	 supra notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
337 See, e.g., Trojan Technologies, 916 F.2d at 913-14 (noting that Congress had noticed,
but not preempted, slate "Buy American" statutes); Bann/ of Trs., 562 A.2d at 741-44 (pre-
senting a summary of congressional debate over state and local South Africa sanctions
including a failed amendment to preempt the sanctions).
"3 See Board of Th., 562 A.2(1 at 741-44.
339 See supra notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
340 See supm notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
341 See 120 S. Ct. at 2301-412.
166	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:123
N. A FLEXIBLE TEST ALLOWING STATE AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY UNDER THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POWER
As a matter of public policy, the federal government should be
able to establish United States foreign policy unfettered by state and
local action. 342 States and localities, however, should have the
flexibility to select investments for their pension funds based on in-
vestment criteria that consider the risk profile of foreign countries. 343
To do less would impair their ability to fulfill their obligations to pen-
sion plan participants. 344 States and localities should also be allowed
to vote in all shareholder resolutions because they have a fiduciary
duty to pension plan participants to exercise their proxies.345 Any
reformulation of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power must balance
these extremes to be workable in this era of global market activity. 546
The Supreme Court's recent reticence to invoke the powerful
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power to nullify state action criticizing other
nations' policies—Crosby—or impacting foreign nationals—Bardays—••
implicitly acknowledges that the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power may
invalidate too much state action in this era of globalization. 347 The
Court's unwillingness to overrule Zschernig expressly, however, also
belies a concern that some state and local action may pose a real
threat to federal uniformity in foreign policy. 548 Thus, the Dormant
Foreign Affairs Power lurks in the background as a constitutional doc-
trine that may be invoked when states and municipalities cross some
line of egregious behavior. 549 As articulated in Zschernig, the line is
drawn at a more than incidental effect on foreign affairs—i.e., criticiz-
ing foreign nations. 350 As states and localities invest more in the global
s42 See generally Ramsey, SUPPTI note 75, at 342.
343 See id. at 374-75 ("There is no precise demarcations between the local and the in-
ternational, and the category of state laws having some potential effect upon foreign policy
is unmanageably broad.").
3" See SUM notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
s.15 See supm note 61 and accompanying text.
'46 See generally FRY, .5 //MT/ note 35, at 3-9; Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 1671-74 (de-
scribing increasing impact of international concerns on issues of domestic governance);
Lewis, supra note 6, at 515-17 (noting immense power of the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power, if construed broadly, to invalidate state action); Ramsey, SUM note 75, at 365 (call-
ing for a reexamination of the merits of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power because "state
activities increasingly have international implications").
"7 See supra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
519 See supra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
December 2000)
	
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
	 167
market, however, more of their actions can he portrayed as a criticism
of foreign nations' policies. 351
 Thus, mere criticism alone is not a
sufficiently flexible test to allow for necessary state and local invest-
ment, not only abroad, but also in U.S. based companies that operate
abroad. 352
 A better approach to determine whether state and local
action interferes with the federal government's ability to make foreign
policy is to first look to other express constitutional restrictions on
state and local power—for example, preemption and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 353
 If there remains an incursion into foreign affairs not
encompassed by other constitutional limits, then the court should ex-
amine whether that state or local action looks substantially like for-
eign policymaking. The Court should consider whether the action is
likely to be confused with United States foreign policy, whether the
action has legitimate undertones of state regulation or market behav-
ior and whether the act punishes those who interact with foreign na-
tions.0
To the extent that state and local actions are likely to impinge
substantially upon the federal government's ability to conduct foreign
affairs, they should be prohibited. 354
 The Dormant. Foreign Affairs
Power under Zschernig, however, sweeps beyond what the average per-
son would consider express foreign policy, by speculating on the po-
tential to disrupt the federal government's ability to create uniform
foreign policy. 355
 By creating a speculative test, the foreign affairs
power applies to more than direct conflicts with expressed United
States foreign policy. 356
 Therein lies its difficulty. It invites the judici-
ary to speculate about the impact of a certain state action on an area,
foreign policy, where the judiciary is not an expert, but states and
municipalities are increasingly involved via the global market. 357 Bar-
clays would appear to reserve judgement until Congress acts. 358 How-
ever, total judicial deference does not fulfill the goal of ensuring that
351 See supra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 132-139.157-163 and accompanying text.
351
 See Goldsmith „cupra note 75, at 1632-33 (distinguishing between slate actions that
impact the federal government's ability to conduct foreign relations and that affect foreign
affairs generally).
355 SeeZschernig v. Miller. 389 U.S. 429,440-41 (1968).
356 See id. at 458-59 (Marian, J., concurring in the judgement).
357 See kl.; see also Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298,327-28 (1994)
(raising concerns about judicial competence in the area of foreign affairs).
358 See 512 U.S. at 327-28,330-31 (indicating that disputes in the foreign affairs area
warrant political, not jtalicW solitt ions).
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states do not hamper United States foreign policy. 359 Congress cannot
realistically preempt every state and local action—there are after all
tens of thousands of sub-federal governmental entities. 36° Therefore,
the Court should reserve the ability to act in the most egregious cases,
where the state action looks substantially like foreign policy. 361
It is not clear that simply because a sub-national government is
acting, it is expressing foreign policy that would interfere with Ameri,
can foreign policy anymore than the actions of a major United States
corporation would interfere with American foreign policy. 562 Yet be-
cause government entities are acting, their actions are more likely to
be confused with official United States foreign policy. 363 If the state is
acting more akin to a private entity, however, that would not be con-
strued to be American foreign policy and the harm to the federal
government is less compelling. 364
Thus, hampering America's ability to create foreign policy is not
the real risk, but confusion over which government is articulating
official United States policy would be a real risk to a uniform federal
policy. 365 Zschernig did not make this distinction, but it should have. 366
Insofar as Zschernig dealt with the allocation of property to foreign
nationals, Zschernig looks more like the American government speak-
ing as the United States on the rights of heirs to take decedent's
property. 367 Probate, in particular, is an area where the federal gov-
ernment generally does not speak, but rather is ordinarily a state mat-
ter.368 Because there is no federal foreign policy on probate disposi-
tion to foreign nationals, the state action becomes the only
359 See supra notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
36° See Denning & McCall, supra note 41, at 369; Ramsey, supra note 75, at 374-75.
361 See Loschin & Anderson, supra note 71, at 406 (arguing that courts should only in-
Validate state. laws when there is a 'clear potential to cause embarrassment" to the United
Stales); Ramsey, supra note 75, at 368 (noting that the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is
based on a functional argument to "avoi(1 conflicting signals to foreign nations").
362 See, e.g., Board of Trs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,747 (Md. 1989) (declin-
ing to conclude that municipal action would impact United States foreign policy).
363 See, e.g., Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Stipp. 1365,1378 (D. N.M. 1980)
(discussing the significance of a state actor criticizing a foreign nation).
364 See, e.g., Burr, supra no 34, at 8 (detailing the growing acceptance of social in-
vestment criteria).
365 See Ramsey, sup/ note 75, at 367 (quoting an expert who argues one.goal of the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is to avoid appearance of confusion about U.S. foreign
policy).
566 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
368 See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
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pronouncement of the nation's policy regarding foreign nationals—
thus it looks like the federal government's policy on this issue. 369
State investment decisions, particularly shareholder resolutions,
however, do not have the same potential for confusion—they cannot
be construed as United States trade policy.379
 Furthermore, to con-
strain state government action, when states are acting in the same
manner as private entities would act, could unduly burden the state's
ability to participate in that area of economic activity."' Because states
are implicitly or explicitly making legislative findings about foreign
governments, state mandates for divestiture, codified in statutory
form, look more like foreign policy statements than state investment
decisions or participation in shareholder resolutions. 372
State and local acts criticizing foreign countries should be evalu-
ated according to the following factors. First, does the state or local
action lead to confusion over what is United States foreign policy?
Second, does the state or local action resemble regulatory action or
market behavior? Third, is the state or local act mandatory, punishing
those who interact with foreign governments, or precatory in nature?
If a court, considering these factors, concludes that the state or local
action looks substantially like an expression of foreign policy and not
legitimate state action relating to foreign nations, then a court should
hold that the action is unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign
Affairs Power. 373
For example, state divestment laws condemn foreign nations on
policy grounds."'" To the extent that divestment laws make findings
about the wrongs created by foreign nations, they sound like foreign
policy pronouncements." As sub-national government entities, these
pronouncements are more similar to expressions of official govern-
ment policy that could he viewed by an outsider as supported by the
341g
 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text
"° See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324-28; see also K.S.B. Technical Sales v. New Jersey Dist. Wa-
ter Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 784 n.6 (N.J. 1977) (noting that "Buy American" law
seemed to be consistent with United States foreign policy).
371 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 6, at 517 (arguing that a broad Dormant Foreign All'airs
Power may have a "chilling effect" on legitimate state activity).
372 See supra note 41-46 mid accompanying text (describing slate divestment statutes).
373
 See grnerally Zsehernig, 389 U.S. at 460 (Harlan.,]., concurring): Trojan Technologies
v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3rd Cir. 1990).
37 ' 1
 See DESIMONE	 Masts, supra note 37, at 17-22 (descrihing South Africa divest-
ment laws condemning apartheid).
175 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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United States.376 Therefore, they carry a higher risk for confusion
with official United States policy.'" Because divestment laws attempt
to alter companies' behavior, and therefore indirectly foreign coun-
tries' behavior, they are punitive in nature. 378 They are, as courts have
concluded in regard to other similar state activity, economic sanc-
tions. 379 Under this functional approach to the Dormant Foreign Af-
fairs Power, divestment laws would be unconstitutional.
Laws requiring that states monitor and report on business prac-
tices abroad, such as the Northern Ireland laws, are precatory in na-
ture. 380 Although they may contain findings about conditions in a for-
eign country that could be considered a criticism of that nation's
policies, the laws do not impose any direct or indirect penalties on
those countries.381 Thus, they attempt to regulate certain businesses,
but do not rise to the level of economic sanctions. 382 Therefore, re-
quirements that a treasurer report on state investments' compliance
with the MacBride Principles look less like a foreign policy initiative,
carry less risk for confusion, and should not be unconstitutional un-
der the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.'"
Participation in shareholder resolutions implicating foreign af-
fairs should be constitutional under the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Clause. 38" States generally have not enacted laws regarding share-
holder resolutions. 385 The state itself, by law, is not making foreign
policy-type pro11ouncements. 386 A state voting on a shareholder reso-
lution is not regulating or mandating any behayior. 387 By itself, with-
out the support of other shareholders, the resolution will not take ef-
fect. 388 Therefore, unlike divestment laws, the state on its own,
although criticizing foreign nations, has no power to give effect to the
376 See, e.g., Tayyari, 495 F. Stipp. at 1378 (discussing danger of sub-national govern-
ment retaliating against foreign countries).
377 See Ramsey, supra note 75, at 367.
378 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 143-155,164-168 and accompanying text.
58° See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
38L See SUPea notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
365 Bus see supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing laws that direct share-
holder voting).
386 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
388 See, e.g., Star, supra note 60, at 8 (describing shareholder resolution on Burma that
failed to gain majority vote).
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proposed policies. 389
 Shareholder resolutions would carry the least
potential for confusion with official foreign policy.
There are other constitutional checks on state power in the area
of foreign affairs to protect federal authority. 390
 As the Court acknowl-
edged in Barclays, Congress always has the power, under the Suprem-
acy Clause, to preempt explicitly state and local action that it finds
particularly offensive."' Although this check may not he viable due to
political or practical considerations, it should serve as the ultimate
constitutional check on state and local activity implicating foreign af-
fairs. 392
 The Crosby Court, by holding that COngress had implicitly pre-
empted state sanctions, broadened subsequent courts' ability to find a
federal statute that similarly preempts state action. 39s Furthermore,
the Equal Protection Clause protects aliens from discriminatory
treatment by states and the Dormant Commerce Clause limits direct
state regulation of foreign commerce. 394
CONCLUSION
The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power is a vague constitutional doc-
trine that may invalidate any state action touching on foreign affairs.
Under its current formulation, the Power excludes any state action
that could be deemed critical of a foreign nation. Perhaps this is why,
in its last term, the Supreme Court in Crosby declined to invoke the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, instead resting its decision on nar-
rower preemption grounds. The doctrine, however, remains in the
Court's arsenal to limit state activity that impacts foreign affairs.
State and local action in the pension investment area can be con-
strued as touching on foreign affairs, both because states have increas-
"9 See id.
39° See GokIsmiill, sup•a note 75, at 1682,1689-90.
39] See U.S. CoNs•. art. VI, cl. 2; 512 U.S. at 330-31.
392 See Denning & McCall, .supra note 41, at 369 (characterizing reliance on congres-
sional action as "shutting the barn door long after the horses have run off"); Goldsmith,
supra note 75, at 1682 ("The likelihood of congressional redress for untoward state activity
will increase as does the clarity and the extent of the threat posed to the national inter-
est,"); Ramsey, SUPM note 75, at 374-75 (arguing that invalidation of all stale laws impact-
ing foreign affairs is an impossible task).
3" See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2294 n.8 (2000).
351 Goldsmith, StIpra note 75, at 1689-90. One could also argue that Zsehernig be-
cause it applied to state's treatment of aliens. presented an equal protection violation.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, state classifications based on alienage are subject to
strict scrutiny, and the law in Zschernigwould probably be found 10 be unconstitutional. See,
e•g., Tayymi, 495 F. Stipp. at 1371-75 (invalidating stale action against Iranians citizens as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clmise, as well as the Dormant Foreign Affairs Powe•).
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ingly been called upon by activists to highlight inequities abroad and
because public pension funds have a growing presence in interna-
tional investments. Their investment activities, therefore, will con-
tinue to be subject to criticism under the Dormant Foreign Affairs
Power.
Because the doctrine, as currently construed, can invalidate state
and local activity in this growing area, it should be clarified. Alterna-
tive approaches, as formulated by lower courts or implied from a
reading of the Court's Foreign Commerce Clause cases, do not ade-
quately weigh legitimate concerns about states and localities intruding
on the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs and,
indeed, its need to express the nation's foreign policy. Furthermore,
their persuasive value is questionable. When the Court revisits the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power, as it undoubtedly will because of the
major role of states and localities in the global economy, it should
consider the need for flexibility when states and localities interact in
ati international setting. These actors must be able to structure their
affairs as global economic actors to uphold their duties to pension
plan participants. The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power should not be
so broad that states and localities are precluded from interacting with
the world.
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